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RACIAL PREFERENCE, REALITY AND THE
CONSTITUTION: BAKKE v. REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Robert Allen Sedler*
George's son had done his work so thoroughly that he was
considered too good a workman to live, and was in fact,
taken and tragically shot at twelve o'clock that same
day-another instance of the untoward fate which so often
attends dogs and other philosophers who follow out a train
of reasoning to its logical conclusion and attempt perfectly
consistent conduct in a world made up so largely of
compromise.I
INTRODUCTION
The above passage from Hardy's Far from the Madding
Crowd, is particularly appropriate to introduce a commentary
on the recent decision of the California Supreme Court in
Bakke v. Regents of the University of California.' Bakke
"follow[ed] out a train of reasoning to its logical conclusion"
without regard to the realities of American life. The California
Supreme Court emphasized "consistency of principle" at the
expense of one of the relatively few societal efforts to help bring
about full equality for blacks and other racial-ethnic minori-
ties3 who have been subject to extreme discrimination and vic-
timization solely because of the color of their skin. In this arti-
cle, I have attempted to explore and develop thoughts on the
meaning of racial equality that go to the essence of the consti-
tutional question presented in Bakke. I do not claim to have
made a comprehensive study of all the dimensions of racially
preferential admissions to law schools and medical schools;4
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School, 1976-77; Professor of Law at Wayne State University, commencing with the
1977-78 academic year; A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. T. HARDY, FAR FROM THE MADDING CROWD 42 (1902).
2. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811).
3. I also consider Puerto Ricans, Chicanos and Native Americans to be racial
minorities.
4. It is in these two professions, traditionally the "leading" professions, that the
shortage of available places has given rise to the problem of racially preferential admis-
sions.
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such a study would probably be redundant in view of the
abundance of academic commentary on the subject. I have
borrowed freely from these works, and have relied greatly on
the research of other commentators in formulating my own
views.
My analysis, however, will be somewhat different from
those advanced previously. I will be approaching the issue of
racial equality with reference to the constitutional values indi-
cated by the particular racial discrimination involved in Bakke
(preference for blacks as a group resulting in discrimination
against individual whites) rather than with reference to the
validity of racial classifications under the compelling state in-
terest test,' the rational basis test,' the substantial interest
test,8 or any such formulation. There is a crucial difference, in
my view, between approaching the problem in terms of racial
classification and approaching it in terms of racial discrimina-
tion. A racial classification, as such, merely involves taking
race into account. Assuming that this produces differential
treatment or "disadvantage" on the basis of race, the court
must decide whether this results in unconstitutional racial dis-
crimination. In resolving that question the court must make an
initial value judgment as to whether the differential treatment
or "disadvantage" causes what may be called "racial injury."
For example, court-ordered school desegregation requires the
classification of students on the basis of race for purposes of
assignment to particular schools. But this has never been con-
sidered by the Supreme Court to constitute racial discrimina-
tion, given the Court's value judgment (inherent in striking
down state imposed segregation) that white children are not
"injured" by attendance at school with black children. Racially
preferential admissions programs, however, obviously cause
''racial injury" to those white applicants who are excluded from
5. See, e.g., DeFunis Symposium, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 483 (1975); DeFunis
Symposium, 60 VA. L. Rxv. 917 (1974); Symposium, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 277.
6. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as
moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal
Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Karst & Horowitz]; O'Neil,
Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. Rav. 925
(1974) [hereinafter cited as O'Neill.
7. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CI.
L. REv. 723 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely].
8. See Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Re-
sponsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. Rav. 653 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Sandalow].
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admission to professional school because of these programs,
and in that sense are racially discriminatory. A court, deciding
on the constitutionality of these programs, must, therefore,
make another value judgment. It must decide whether the Con-
stitution prohibits all forms of racial discrimination, or if not,
whether this particular form of racial discrimination is consti-
tutionally proscribed. The fact that a racial classification is
involved adds little, if anything, to this analysis, and focusing
on the classification rather than on the resulting discrimination
may merely serve to obscure the crucial value judgments that
the court will necessarily be making.
Moreover, to analyze the validity of racially preferential
admissions programs in terms of the classification being made
necessitates application of the two-tier, frequently result-
dispositive, approach to questions of equal protection and due
process which the Supreme Court has found so troublesome in
recent years.' The Court's consideration of the constitution-
ality of racially preferential admissions programs in Bakke, will
furnish it with the opportunity to abandon the two-tier ap-
proach once and for all, and to adopt a standard of review that
will enable the courts to deal directly and explicitly with the
hard value judgments and the ends and means questions that
clearly influence their decisions in due process and equal pro-
tection cases."0
9. Under the two-tier approach, governmental action is tested by the "rational
basis" standard unless it involves a "suspect classification" or infringes upon a
"fundamental right," in which case, the strict scrutiny standard requires that a
"compelling" state interest be established.
The Court's dissatisfaction in recent years with the two-tier approach is reflected
in its unwillingness to recognize any new suspect classifications or fundamental rights
requiring strict scrutiny. Cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (sex not recognized
as a suspect classification); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (education not recognized as a fundamental right); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing not recognized as a fundamental right). Moreover, some
Justices have argued for constitutional analysis leading to a single standard of review
or to a sliding scale of standards. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 456 (1973)
(White, J. concurring); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 98-99 (Marshall, J. dissenting); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-
73 (1972). Even more significantly, the rational basis standard has begun to be used
to invalidate governmental action. See generally Gunther, Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. Rv. 1 (1972).
10. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50
(1973) for example, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, made it clear that if the
Court had held that education was a fundamental right, and thus subject to the strict
scrutiny test, local school district financing would have been invalidated because of
the availability of less drastic alternative means. He went on to emphasize the value
19771
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I submit that the Constitution does not prevent the state
from giving the type of limited racial preference to racial-
ethnic minorities rejected in Bakke, and upheld in DeFunis v.
Odegaard, "1 and Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center."2 This is
because, in my view, such a limited racial preference is fully
consistent with the values embodied in the fourteenth
amendment-its broader, organic purposes"3-the primal one
being minority equality and the full integration of racial minor-
ities groups into the mainstream of American society.'4 More-
over, such a preference does not discriminate against whites
as a group, notwithstanding that its existence may result in
the exclusion of some individual whites from medical school
and law school.
Its constitutionality must be viewed with reference to the
realities of present-day American society, the past history of
victimization of racial minorities, and what has been called the
constitutional right of black freedom, protected by the four-
teenth amendment and the other Civil War Amendments.15
When so viewed, "in a world made up so largely of compro-
mise," its constitutionality clearly can be sustained.
BAKKE v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
The medical school at the University of California at
Davis, recognizing a need to increase minority representation
in the medical profession, adopted a special admissions pro-
gram exclusively for disadvantaged minorities." The univer-
of local autonomy and, in effect, to make the value judgment that local autonomy was
more important than equalization of educational resources.
11. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
12. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976). The court stated that
the racial preference advanced a substantial state interest and thus was presumptively
constitutional. Such a presumption could be overcome if the court found the particular
program was not sufficiently limited in size and duration, but since the assailant did
not show that he would have been admitted even if the program had been invalidated,
the New York court did not pass on the scope of the program. Id. at 338, 348 N.E.2d
at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
13. As the Court noted in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967), the fourteenth
amendment is not to be interpreted solely with reference to the intent of its framers,
but is to be given a dynamic interpretation. Nevertheless, the historical objectives of
the fourteenth amendment are relevant in determining its broader, organic purposes.
See text accompanying notes 129-40 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 129-40 infra.
15. The Civil War Amendments are the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. See generally Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21
RUTGEas L. REV. 387 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kinoy].
16. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 41, 43, 553 P.2d 1152, 1157,
1159, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 685, 687 (1976).
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sity set aside 16 places in a class of 100 to be filled by applicants
considered under the special admissions program. All white
applicants were considered in the regular admissions program,
which automatically rejected anyone whose grade point aver-
age was below 2.5. The special admissions program, however,
had no such automatic disqualification and, in fact, admitted
minority applicants with grade point averages below 2.5. The
court said "it is clear that the special admissions program clas-
sifies applicants by race"' 7 and concluded the program violated
the constitutional rights of nonminority students.
The result is quite ironic. Historically, the equal protection
clause was viewed as primarily protecting blacks and other
racial minorities from state-imposed discrimination that would
impede their achieving full equality in American society,,' but
for a long time, it had been interpreted so restrictively that
blacks received very little protection from it." In Bakke, the
equal protection clause came full circle to invalidate a very
limited preference for racial minorities that was designed to
overcome the cumulative effects of societal discrimination
against them. The effect of the decision is to protect the inter-
ests of individual whites over the interests of minorities as a
group in achieving full equality in American society, insofar as
such equality would be achieved by increasing the number of
minority lawyers and doctors to a level in proportion to their
numbers in the population as a whole.
Bakke's Standing
Initially, it should be pointed out that Bakke's standing to
sue was questionable. The court reasoned that there would be
no constitutional violation if the university gave preference to
disadvantaged students of all races. 0 Since minority students
17. Id. at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
18. See notes 42 and 129 and accompanying text infra. See also Frank & Munro,
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131,
132-42 [hereinafter cited as Frank & Munro].
19. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, chs. 1-4 (1975), for an interesting discussion
of the United States Supreme Court's early interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment with a view toward "black freedom." Only with the invalidation of the
"separate but equal" doctrine of state imposed segregation in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny has the fourteenth amendment made a significant
dent in the legal structure of societal racism.
20. According to the California Supreme Court:
In short, the standards for admission employed by the University are
not constitutionally infirm except to the extent that they are utilized in
a racially discriminatory manner. Disadvantaged applicants of all races
1977]
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who were not disadvantaged were not allowed in the special
admissions program," the racial classification only discrimi-
nated against disadvantaged whites. However, Bakke did not
claim to be disadvantaged. The racial preference, therefore,
did not violate any of Bakke's rights, and no basis existed for
allowing Bakke to assert the rights of disadvantaged whites.22
In effect, Bakke prevailed by asserting the rights of third par-
ties in a case that was clearly not one for third party standing.
Even more importantly, perhaps, Bakke made no showing
that he was in fact injured by the operation of the racially
preferential admissions program, since he could not show that
he would have been admitted if the program had not been in
effect. The court treated this question as relevant only to the
remedy, reasoning by analogy to other cases that since the
university unconstitutionally discriminated against Bakke, it
had the burden of showing he would not have been admitted if
the program had not been in effect. 3 Under the federal concept
of standing, however, invalidation of the challenged action
must be likely to produce some direct benefit to the plaintiff.'4
Using that concept, Bakke would not have had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the university's racial pref-
erential admissions program. Although I do not favor the use
of standing as an independent limitation on judicial review, 5
the California Supreme Court does," and while the court was
must be eligible for sympathetic consideration, and no applicant may be
rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as
measured by standards applied without regard to race.
18 Cal. 3d at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
21. Id. at 42-43, 553 P.2d at 1158, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
22. In determining the propriety of jus tertii standing, the primary considera-
tions are the relationship between the assailant and the person whose rights are being
asserted and the practicability of assertion by the holders of the rights. See, e.g.,
Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). See also Sedler, Standing to Assert
Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 646-48 (1962).
23. In Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals determined the excluded white
applicant had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the program. However,
because he failed to show that he would have been admitted if the program had not
been in effect, he had not established a right to relief, and the court would not consider
the reasonableness of the racial preference for minorities. Id. at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547,
384 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
24. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
25. See Sedler, Standing, Justiciability and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25
VAnD. L. Rav. 479 (1972).
26. See, e.g., In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 78, 485 P.2d 785, 796, 95 Cal.
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not willing to sacrifice "consistency of principle" when it came
to the merits, it is at least questionable whether it was equally
faithful to its own principles of standing.
The Constitutional Analysis Applied in Bakke
In Bakke, the court noted that a classification based on
race is "subject to strict scrutiny, at least where the classifica-
tion results in detriment to a person because of his race."" By
this standard, such a classification not only must satisfy a
compelling state interest but must do so by means least intru-
sive on the constitutional rights of others. While assuming ar-
guendo that the racial classification advanced compelling state
interests, the court was unconvinced that these interests could
not be achieved by means "less detrimental to the rights of the
majority.''28 Specifically, the assumedly compelling racial
objectives-increasing minority representation in the medical
profession and achieving racial integration of the student
body-did not satisfy the strict scrutiny test because the court
concluded that those objectives could be achieved by non-
racial means.
The court's invalidation of the classification under the
compelling state interest test accords with the result generally
reached whenever that test is applied and for the same reason.
In nearly all cases it will be possible to find that alternative
means would, to some extent, accomplish the desired objective,
although perhaps not as effectively as the means that were
chosen. Invoking the compelling state interest test then be-
comes result-dispositive. Once a court holds that the validity
of a law or other governmental action must be tested against
the "strict scrutiny" standard, the result will almost always be
a declaration of unconstitutionality."5 It may be precisely be-
cause the invocation of "strict scrutiny" produces this result
that the Supreme Court has shied away from creating any new
suspect classifications or fundamental rights, and appears to
be moving away from the "two-tier" approach to equal protec-
Rptr. 433, 444 (1971), cert. denied sub nom., Gumen v. California, 404 U.S. 1015
(1972).
27. 18 Cal. 3d at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
28. Id. at 52-53, 553 P.2d at 1164-65, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93.
29. As Chief Justice Burger has observed with respect to the compelling state
interest standard: "So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly
insurmountable standard." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
19771
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tion and due process questions."
Nevertheless, the special admissions program properly
could have been sustained under the compelling state interest
test. Since the assumedly compelling state interests were racial
in nature, the court could have held that nonracial alterna-
tives were irrelevant to their advancement. This was the con-
clusion of the Washington Supreme Court in DeFunis v.
Odegaard,31 and of the New York Court of Appeals in A levy v.
Downstate Medical Center.31
The real problem with the compelling state interest test or
with any other effort to link the result with a differing standard
of review is that it obscures the value judgments which are an
integral part of defining broad constitutional concepts such as
equal protection and due process, and which determine what
standard applies in any particular situation. It is difficult to
believe that the Supreme Court or any other court is not mak-
ing a value judgment when it decides upon the appropriate
standard of review in the context of a challenge to a particular
law or governmental action.33 It would be far better for the
court to discuss explicitly those value judgments as they ap-
pear in the context of specific challenges-an action more
likely to occur if a single standard of review were adopted.
The fundamental value question in these cases is whether
a state is justified in giving racial preference to minorities as a
group when this results in discrimination against individual
whites. To say that since the racial objective is compelling,
only racial means are relevant to the accomplishment of that
objective, is to make the value judgment in favor of racial
preference. By the same token, to hold that nonracial means
must be considered, will necessarily skew the value judgment
against racial preference since it is obvious that nonracial
means can always be found. Under the "less drastic means"
aspect of the compelling state interest test, it does not matter
that the means chosen will accomplish the racial objective less
effectively. The California Supreme Court clearly made a value
judgment against racial preferences by applying the "strict
scrutiny" standard of review and by holding that nonracial
30. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
31. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 31-32, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S.
312 (1974).
32. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 336-37, 348 N.E.2d 537, 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 90 (1976).
33. This is particularly illustrated by decisions such as San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See note 10 supra.
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alternatives had to be considered.
The court's reliance in Bakke on the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review is doubly ironic. At least in recent times, the
compelling state interest test as applied to racial classifica-
tions, was formulated in the context of the Supreme Court's
invalidation of discrimination against blacks as a group or dis-
crimination against blacks and whites equally. 4 Furthermore,
in those cases in which the standard developed, the racial dis-
crimination invalidated did not advance even a legitimate, let
alone compelling, state interest, and it was struck down for
that reason rather than because "less drastic means". were not
employed. 5 Thus, invoking strict scrutiny was completely un-
necessary to the decision of those cases, 3 and in practice, strict
scrutiny has been of no real utility to minorities in their legal
struggles against societal racism. In Bakke, the strict scrutiny
test invalidated one of the few instances where American so-
ciety has given preference to racial minorities, because the
preference had the effect of discriminating against individual
whites, although not against whites as a group. The primary
beneficiaries of this more restrictive standard of review in ra-
cial cases, therefore, have not been minorities, but individual
whites, whose interests were preferred over the interests of mi-
norities as a group and over the societal interest in bringing
about full equality for racial minorities.
Equal Protection for the Individual or for the Group?
The court in Bakke was not concerned with the historical
purpose of the fourteenth amendment or with full equality for
racial minorities in American society. In its view,
"[riegardless of its historical origin, the equal protection
clause by its literal terms applies to 'any person,' and its lofty
purpose, to secure equality of treatment to all, is incompatible
with the premise that some races may be afforded a higher
protection against unequal treatment more than others. '37 But
the preference involved in Bakke was not a preference for
"some races." It was a preference for the racial-ethnic minority
34. See notes 227-33 and accompanying text infra. Those cases in which the
compelling state interest test was supposedly applied were cited in Bakke v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 49, 553 P.2d 1152, 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 690
(1976).
35. See notes 152-65 and accompanying text infra.
36. See notes 166-69 and accompanying text infra.
37. 18 Cal. 3d at 51, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
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groups in American society who have been victimized and dis-
criminated against because of their color. To say that the lofty
purpose of the fourteenth amendment is to "secure equality of
treatment to all," begs the question of how equality of treat-
ment can be secured for racial minorities in American society,
given the realities of our society and the cumulative effects of
over 300 years of discrimination against them. Although the
law may say that all people are equal, realistically in American
society white people as a group have always been "more equal"
than black people. To invalidate a preference for racial minori-
ties as a group because it results in discrimination against indi-
vidual whites is to "follow a train of reasoning to its logical
conclusion" without taking account of the origin of that train
of reasoning and without considering the consequences of
"seeking perfect consistency in a world so largely made up of
compromise." Those consequences, as I shall explain, may
spell an end to efforts to increase minority representation in the
legal and medical professions.
The court stated its concern for consistency of principle
when it wrote:
To uphold the University would call for the sacrifice of
principle for the sake of dubious expediency and would
represent a retreat in the struggle to assure that each man
and woman shall be judged on the basis of individual merit
alone, a struggle which has only lately achieved success in
removing legal barriers to racial equality. The safest
course, the one most consistent with the fundamental in-
terests of all races and with the design of the Constitution
is to hold, as we do, that the special admission program is
unconstitutional because it violates the rights guaranteed
to the majority by the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution s
It is this proposition with which I would most strongly
disagree.
The "principle" that the fourteenth amendment prohibits
all differential treatment between racial minorities and
whites,3" even when that differential treatment is for the bene-
38. Id. at 62-63, 553 P.2d at 1171-72, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
39. The principal of racial neutrality has been put forth as follows: "[Tihe
proper constitutional.principle is not, no 'invidious' racial or ethnic discrimination, but
no use of racial or ethnic criteria to determine the distribution of government benefits
or burdens." Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 25. "Both as a matter of constitu-
[Vol. 17
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fit of minorities as a group and does not discriminate against
whites as a group, is neither "required by history, nor can it be
derived from a more general principle of constitutional law." 0
On the contrary, it is inconsistent with the broader organic
purpose of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of racial
equality and with the constitutional right of black freedom that
the Civil War Amendments, taken as a whole, were designed
to implement. There is nothing in the design of the Constitu-
tion that prohibits the states from taking affirmative action of
the kind involved in Bakke to assure full equality for blacks
and other racial-ethnic minorities in American society. Indeed,
in view of the realities of American society today, it is only by
the taking of such action that the design of the Civil War
Amendments-true freedom for the emancipated blacks and
their full integration into American society-will ever be real-
ized.
A proper constitutional analysis, giving due regard to all
of the values embodied in the fourteenth amendment and other
Civil War Amendments, requires a court to distinguish be-
tween the following categories of racial discrimination:
tional law, and of social decency expressed in state and federal legislation, we have
come to view all forms of discrimination based on race as not merely suspect, and at
least presumptively intolerable." Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solu-
tion to a Real Problem, 1970 U. TOL. L. Rav. 377, 379.
For at least a generation the lesson of the great decisions of this Court
and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same: discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently
wrong and destructive of democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned
and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but
only a matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was
demanded are now to be more equal than others. Having found support
in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support for inequality
under the same Constitution.
Brief for B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (authored by Professors Alexander Bickel and Phillip
Kurland), quoted in Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard: The "Non-Decision" with a
Message, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 520, 521-22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lavinsky]. Simi-
lar views were expressed by Justice Douglas in his dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312, 340-41 (1974), although he argued that in order to admit all applicants in a
racially neutral way, the university was required to be "color-conscious" in considering
the possible basis of objective indicators such as the LSAT and the impact of racial
discrimination on particular applicants.
40. Sandalow, supra note 8, at 681. In commenting on Professor Posner's state-
ment, quoted in note 39 supra, Professor Sandalow observed: "A constitutional princi-
ple that government may not distribute burdens or benefits on racial or ethnic grounds
is required neither by the 'intentions of the framers' nor by a more general principle
of constitutional law." Id. at 675. See generally id. at 675-81.
19771
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1) discrimination against blacks as a group; i.e., discrim-
ination against all individual blacks because of their group
membership;
2) discrimination against blacks as a group and against
whites as a group; i.e., blacks and whites are discriminated
against mutually because of their respective group mem-
bership;
3) discrimination in favor of blacks as a group, which
results in discrimination against whites as a group; i.e.,
benefits are given only to blacks because of their group
membership and denied entirely to whites because of their
group membership;
4) discrimination in favor of blacks as a group which re-
sults in discrimination against individual whites, but not
against whites as a group; i.e., benefits are given to blacks
because of their group membership and denied to individ-
ual whites because of their group membership, but those
benefits are not denied substantially to whites as a group.
Racially preferential admissions cases, such as Bakke, in-
volve the fourth category of discrimination. I will endeavor to
show that the first three categories of racial discrimination
clearly violate the fourteenth amendment. It is my contention,
however, that, considering the values of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the need to accommodate conflicting values and the rea-
sonableness of the means employed to do so, in light of the
present societal condition of blacks, the fourth category of dis-
crimination does not offend the Constitution.
The protections of the fourteenth amendment quite pro-
perly are not limited to blacks, and extend to individuals as
well as groups.4 ' Admittedly, one of the values embodied in the
fourteenth amendment is the value of racial neutrality and, in
the broader sense, of racial equality, which does render
"suspect" distinctions drawn on the basis of race.
But there is another value embodied in the fourteenth
amendment and the other Civil War Amendments-the value
of black freedom.42 This value seeks to insure full equality for
blacks in American society, to eliminate all the badges and
incidents of servitude, to overcome the consequences of societal
racism, and to bring about the full integration of blacks into
American society as free and equal human beings. When courts
consider racial discrimination against blacks, these two values
41. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
42. See notes 133-34 and accompanying text infra.
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operate in tandem. But when courts consider racial preferences
in favor of blacks which operate to produce racial discrimina-
tion against whites, these values may conflict, requiring a de-
termination as to which value shall be paramount in the partic-
ular circumstances presented. The purpose of the particular
racial discrimination or racial preference, the context in which
it occurs, its impact on the individual or group against which
it is directed and the reasonableness of the means employed are
all part of the constitutional equation. Every effort must be
made to accommodate these conflicting values.
In Bakke, the California Supreme Court did not try to
make any accommodation. It focused entirely on the value of
racial neutrality between blacks and whites, ignoring com-
pletely the value of black freedom and of true equality for
blacks in American society. The court made a value judgment
in favor of racial neutrality and against the long-range societal
benefits sought to be achieved by the racial preference. 3 The
court recognized the persuasiveness of arguing for the need for
racial preference in order to advance equality of opportunity for
blacks. But in the context of a multi-racial society, the court
concluded that the detrimental effects of racial preference out-
weighed the benefits." Yet, the court was not compelled to
reach such a value judgment. Its value judgment contrasts
sharply with that of the New York Court of Appeals. In Alevy
v. Downstate Medical Center, that court stated in an unani-
mous opinion: "It would indeed be ironic and, of course, would
cut against the very grain of the amendment, were the equal
protection clause used to strike down measures designed to
achieve real equality for persons whom it was intended to
aid."45
If the Constitution prohibits the kind of limited racial
preference for minorities invalidated in Bakke, it should be
because it is contrary to the values reflected in the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. How-
ever, it is completely incongruous to say, as the court did in
Bakke, that while the uncompromising principle of equal pro-
tection is racial neutrality between blacks and whites, racial
classifications can be sustained if they satisfy the compelling
43. 18 Cal. 3d at 61-63, 553 P.2d at 1170-72, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 698-700.
44. Compare id. at 61-62, 553 P.2d at 1171, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699 with Alevy v.
Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 335-36, 348 N.E.2d 537, 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d
82, 89-90 (1976).
45. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 334-35, 348 N.E.2d 537, 544-45, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 89 (1976).
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state interest test. It is equally incongruous to assume on the
one hand, as the court did in Bakke, that the state's interest
in increasing black representation in the professions is compel-
ling, but to hold on the other hand, that it cannot advance that
interest by the giving of a racial preference, because nonracial
alternatives could advance that interest, although not as effec-
tively, "by means less detrimental to the rights of the major-
ity."'" It is time to decide, clearly and forthrightly, whether, in
light of the values contained in the fourteenth amendment, the
state may or may not give blacks as a group, the kind of limited
preference that was involved in Bakke.
The Effect of Bakke-Real or Imagined?
The court in Bakke listed nonracial alternatives the uni-
versity could have adopted to achieve its racial objective, mak-
ing it clear that the university could admit students on vir-
tually any basis it chose so long as it did not explicitly take race
into account. 7 The court emphasized that the university was
not required to use only the highest academic credentials. Such
an admissions criterion, it noted, may not "accurately reflect
the abilities of some disadvantaged students."'8 Similarly, the
university could take into account factors relating to "the
needs of the profession and society, such as an applicant's pro-
fessional goals."' 9 And, it could also give preference to disad-
vantaged students of all races, even to the point of establishing
a disadvantaged quota, since the Constitution does not pro-
hibit discrimination in favor of less advantaged students over
more advantaged ones."
Subterfuge: I seriously doubt that the California Supreme
Court intended to eliminate efforts to increase the number of
minority medical and law students. 51 All it has really done, as
Justice Tobriner noted in his dissent, is to require that the
medical schools and the law schools desiring to continue prefer-
ential racial admissions be more disingenuous about it and
46. 18 Cal. 3d at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
47. Id. at 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
48.. Id.
49. Id. at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
50. Id. at 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1166-67, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694-95.
51. Most opponents of racially preferential admissions appear to be in favor of
increased black enrollment in law schools and medical schools so long as it is accom-
plished by means other than racial preference. See, e.g., Graglia, Special Admission
of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 3 BLAcK L.J. 232, 233-234 (1973); Lavin-
sky, supra note 39, at 533.
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engage in a manipulation of labels so that the racial preference
will be concealed by subterfuge. '5 2 Since a university may use
"flexible admissions standards, '"" it would not be surprising
that a university strongly committed to preferential racial
admissions would just "happen" to admit substantially the
same number of minority applicants under these standards as
it did when race was an admissions criteria. However, to avoid
an open refusal to follow Bakke, a university will have to give
every application special consideration, which many schools,
faced by burgeoning admissions demands, may be unwilling to
do. If they do not give such special consideration, they will
again be found to have been practicing racial discrimination
once another Bakke is again excluded and discovers that mi-
norities have been admitted under the flexible admissions
standards in substantially the same proportion as before.
If a school does not want to depart from its heavy reliance
on objective academic criteria, but still wants to increase its
number of black students, it may establish a preferential ad-
missions program for "disadvantaged students of all races."'
Of course, if it uses the "disadvantaged" criterion, it must
exclude from the preferential admissions program advantaged
minority students who might not compete well against advan-
taged whites, yet who are more likely to perform better aca-
demically than disadvantaged students of either race. It would
also have to include disadvantaged whites, whose inclusion,
regardless of whether it might be justified on nonracial
grounds,55 will not serve the racial objective that was assumed
in Bakke to be compelling. Moreover, while proportionately
there is a substantially higher incidence of disadvantaged indi-
viduals among blacks as a group than among whites as a group,
in strict number terms, there are more disadvantaged whites
than there are disadvantaged blacks.56 Assuming that disad-
52. 18 Cal. 3d at 89-90, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718. (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
53. Id. at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
54. Id. The preference for disadvantaged students may in practice be a subter-
fuge to increase the number of blacks and other racial-ethnic minorities, and thus
amount to a "de facto racial classification rather than a de jure preference." O'Neil,
supra note 6, at 951. See also Karst & Horowitz, supra note 6, at 971.
55. See notes 103-07 and accompanying text infra.
56. In 1974 there were 6.2 million white children (under 18 years old) in families
below low income level compared to 4.0 million "black and other race" children. But
only 11.2% of white children were in families below low income level, compared with
and 38.4% "black and other race" children. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMRCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1975, at 399, table 652
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vantaged blacks and disadvantaged whites are more or less
equally qualified,5" to obtain substantially the same number of
blacks under the "disadvantaged" criterion as it did under
straight racial preference, a university would have to admit at
least an equal number of disadvantaged whites.58 To do so will
reduce the available space and exclude an even larger number
of advantaged whites than previously. Bakke's victory could
turn out to be very phyrric indeed. On the other hand, a univer-
sity may conclude that such a result would cause a greater
erosion in academic quality than it is willing to accept. Thus
it will keep the same quota of special admittees, but cut the
number of minority students. While this will open up preferen-
tial admissions for disadvantaged whites, it will be counter-
productive for the racial objectives that were assumed in Bakke
to be compelling.
Legitimizes lack of social concern. The real danger posed
by Bakke is that many schools will decide they are unwilling
to make any burdensome effort to increase minority enroll-
ment. Although preferential admissions programs are appar-
ently widespread,59 within every institution there are likely to
be those who object to the continuation of such programs. Such
individuals might honestly believe that racial considerations
[hereinafter cited as 1975 ABSTRACT]. The excess of disadvantaged whites over disad-
vantaged blacks is also reflected in law school applications. LSDAS statistics that I
have seen indicate that in the applications for the nationwide entering class of 1977,
using the lower cut-off point of a 2.5 GPA and a 500 LSAT score, over 1000 white
applicants characterized their socio-economic status as "low." The total number of
black, Chicano and Puerto Rican applicants in that range, without regard to socio-
economic status, was approximately 350. The number of minority students who char-
acterized their socio-economic status as "low" was 130 (although not all students
indicated their status).
57. This is an unlikely assumption since the majority of black students now
applying to medical school and law school are likely to have received all or part of their
primary and secondary education in racially segregated schools, a factor in the cause
of academic inferiority among blacks in particular. See notes 84-98 and accompanying
text infra.
58. But see Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal. 3d at 54 n.22,
553 P.2d at 1166 n.22, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694 n.22 (criticizing the view that the percen-
tage of disadvantaged students accepted for admission would have to be increased in
order to achieve racial integration).
59. In its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in DeFunis, the Association
of American Law Schools stated: "Law schools differ greatly in their admission poli-
cies. Almost all law schools seek to have a reasonable representation of minority stu-
dents. The University of Washington Law School thought 37 students out of 145 was
reasonable. The result in other law schools ranges between about five or ten percent
of their students." Brief for the Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae
at 15-16, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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have an undesirable effect on both whites and blacks,"0 or they
might be concerned about the dilution of academic standards.
Bakke constitutionalizes the objections to racial preference,
and the burden that the decision imposes on institutions in
order to continue admitting minorities may persuade many
that they have done enough. Any pangs of conscience at bar-
ring the doors of the professions to minorities can be salved by
remembering, "The court made us do it." It may turn out then
that the price for "consistency of principle" will be paid, as it
so often is, by the minorities."' Although I do not think that
that was the intent of the California Supreme Court in Bakke,
the practical effect of the decision may be to deal a crippling
blow to efforts to increase minority representation in the legal
and medical professions."
SPECIAL ADMISSIONS BASED UPON RACE:
A HARD LOOK AT THE REALITIES
An integral part of a value analysis of the constitutionality
of racially preferential admissions is the necessity and justifica-
tion for the preference. To properly develop the justification for
preferential admission based upon race, it is first necessary to
consider the realities of American life and the impact that
racism has had on American society. 3
The Reality of Admissions Without Regard to Race
More than ever before, medical and law schools are experi-
encing a shortage of openings for admissions, and the number
60. It is argued that these programs "stigmatize" black students by branding
them with a "stamp of inferiority." See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). On the other hand, as has been observed: "Indeed, if the
stigmatizing effect of preferential programs were as great as that of segregated schools,
one would expect to find blacks avoiding such programs, black organizations opposing
them, and black leaders denouncing them. In practice, however, one finds nothing of
the sort and indeed finds the opposite." Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and
Admissions: A Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 534, 554-55 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Nickel]. And, of course, if the choice is between being
"stigmatized" and not being admitted at all, blacks, like other students would proba-
bly prefer to be "stigmatized." See also O'Neil, supra note 6, at 941.
61. For example, where equality of treatment is supposedly afforded to blacks
and whites, in reality blacks may be disadvantaged by adherence to the equality. See,
e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
62. See Brief for the Deans of California Law Schools as Amicus Curiae at 29-
31, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 76-811 (U.S. filed Dec. 14, 1976).
63. In my discussion of the realities of American society, I have focused exclu-
sively on the conditions of blacks. To the extent other racial minorities confront similar
conditions, the need and value of a special admissions program also apply to them.
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of applicants who are minimally qualified 4 vastly exceeds the
number of available places. 5 The approach generally taken by
the schools has been to determine who among the minimally
qualified applicants are the "most qualified" in relation to
each other. Since the probability of academic success is the
objective of the selection process, it is not surprising that the
criteria of selection relate to predictors of academic perform-
ance, such as prior academic performance and performance on
standardized aptitude tests such as the Law School Admissions
Test (LSAT) and the Medical College Aptitude Test (MCAT).
In response to increasing admissions, more and more emphasis
is placed on these objective indicators, with correspondingly
less opportunity for evaluation of individual factors such as
motivation, personality and the like." Unfortunately, as will be
64. Minimally qualified applicants refer to those for whom there is a reasonable
probability they will successfully complete the course of study and graduate, based on
objective factors of academic qualification used by law and medical schools. Such
factors are not designed to predict professional success. At least in law school, there is
little correlation between academic performance and professional success, primarily
because law schools teach only some of the skills necessary for professional success.
As Dean Griswold has stated:
To equate law school success with success in practice is also a dangerous
proposition, for law school education, as it now exists, is best geared to
training in the analytical and research skills required of practitioners. It
does not train effectively in the skills of advocacy, counselling, drafting,
negotiation, client relations, fact investigation and preparation, which
are also of prime importance in practice; and it may well be that law
schools should not attempt such training. Nor do these skills involve the
same aspects of intellectual capacity as the analytical skills.
Griswold, Some Observations on the DeFunis Case, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 512, 515 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Griswold]. For an "official" admission in this regard, see Brief
for the Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Brief for the Law School Admission Council as Amicus
Curiae at 10-11, id.
65. In Bakke, there were 3737 applicants for 100 available places in the medical
school's 1974 entering class. 18 Cal. 3d at 38, 553 P.2d at 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
In A levy, the medical school had 6300 applications for 216 positions. 39 N.Y.2d at 329,
348 N.E.2d at 540, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 85. In DeFunis, the University of Washington law
school had 1601 applications for 150 positions. 416 U.S. at 314. The ten to one ratio of
applicants for available places holds true for a number of law schools with which I am
familiar. Overall, despite the very large number of law schools in this country (includ-
ing those of dubious academic quality which are limited to accreditation within a
single state), it was estimated in 1973 that there were two "minimally qualified"
applicants for every available law school place. See Redish, Preferential Law School
Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing
Arguments, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343, 361 & n.85 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Redish].
66. Individual interviews appear to be a regular part of the medical school admis-
sion process, although the primary basis of selection for individual interviews is gener-
ally the objective indicators. In the law school process, interviews are not generally
used, the selection being almost entirely based on objective indicators.
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discussed below, blacks as a group have relatively poor records
of academic performance compared with whites as a group and
perform relatively poorly on standardized aptitude tests. Be-
cause the white population is close to eight times greater than
the black population,67 and whites as a group are more academ-
ically qualified than blacks as a group, the normal working of
the admission process will produce-few if any black students.
The only way most black applicants can compete for admission
is if there is an exception to the normal admissions process
when considering black academic qualifications while main-
taining standards sufficiently high so as to accept only those
black applicants likely to complete medical or law school.
Unless some type of affirmative action is taken, the inabil-
ity of blacks to compete successfully with whites for a limited
number of places in medical schools and law schools will per-
petuate the existence of woefully inadequate numbers of black
doctors and lawyers.18 Although the population is over eleven
percent black,69 less than three percent of all doctors and less
than two percent of all lawyers are black.70 While preferential
67. As of July 1, 1974, the white population totaled approximately 184,000,000,
the black population approximately 24,000,000 and "other" approximately 3,000,000.
1975 ABSTRACT, supra note 56, table 26.
68. "The total number of blacks, Mexican-Americans, American Indians, and
mainland Puerto Ricans enrolled in medical schools between 1969 and 1974 was only
8 percent." Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d at 52 n.19, 553 P.2d at 1164
n.19, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692 n.19. The Bakke court noted the significantly increased
enrollment of minority students after the university instituted the special admissions
program. But the court also noted there was no evidence of what standards of admis-
sions had been previously used, "and it may well be that virtually determinative
weight was accorded to test scores and grades." Id. at 54, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 693. The court in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 330,
348 N.E.2d 537, 541, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (1976), also noted a significant increase in
the enrollment of minority students after initiating a racially preferential admissions
program.
69. 1975 ABSTRACT, supra note 56.
70. In Alevy, the court cited 1970 figures indicating that 2.2% of all doctors in
the United States were black. 39 N.Y.2d at 330, 348 N.E.2d at 541, 384 N.Y.S.2d at
86. As of 1974, there was one doctor for every 750 persons in the general population,
but only one black doctor for every 3500 blacks. At that time there were apparently
only 250 Chicano and 56 Native American doctors in the entire country. O'Neil, supra
note 6, at 943-44. O'Neil points out that since 1971-72, the enrollment of black law
students has exceeded the numbers of black lawyers in practice. While as of 1970 there
was one lawyer for every 637 persons, there was one black lawyer for every 7000 blacks,
and at that time less than 4000 of the 300,000 lawyers in the country were black.
Redish, supra note 65, at 389 & nn.194 & 195.
As to the shortage of Chicano lawyers, see Reynoso, La Raza, The Law and the
Law Schools, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 809, 814-16. In California, as of 1967, the ratio of
white lawyers to whites was one for every 530; for Spanish-surnamed lawyers to
Spanish-surnamed citizens, it was one for every 9482. As to the shortage of Puerto
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admissions programs have increased somewhat the numbers of
black lawyers and doctors, society is a long way from having a
reasonable, let alone proportionate, number of black doctors
and lawyers in relation to the black population as a whole.7
As a society then, we are faced with gross underrepre-
sentation of blacks in the legal and medical professions at a
time when the normal admissions process will admit very few
black students. The choices for the law schools and medical
schools in regard to black applicants are clear: 1) retain the
present objective admissions standards for all applicants, seek-
ing the most academically qualified applicants and admit few
or no black students; 2) make an individual determination of
the intrinsic capability of each applicant, giving little consider-
ation to objective standards; 3) reserve a reasonable number of
places, by either a fixed or fluctuating quota, for the most
qualified black applicants to obtain a reasonable number of
black students without abandoning primary reliance on objec-
tive criteria. To their credit, most law schools and medical
schools have not closed their eyes to the effect of the normal
admissions process on blacks and the resulting professional
underrepresentation. However, they have been unwilling to
abandon their primary reliance on objective criteria, realisti-
cally doubting their ability, in light of mounting applications,
to make an across-the-board determination of the intrinsic
ability of each applicant. Although I have not verified this, I
am reasonably sure that practically all law schools and medical
schools which have increased the size of their black student
body above token numbers in recent years have opted for the
racially preferential quota, either fixed or fluctuating. How-
ever, because quota has been discredited, they may not so de-
scribe their admissions program. I am also reasonably sure that
the size of the quota in practically all places is not large, and
will rarely exceed the proportionate black population of the
state or region.
Rican lawyers, see Carbranes, Careers in Law for Minorities: A Puerto Rican's Perspec-
tive on Recent Developments in Legal Education, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 447, 450-51 (1973).
In New York, with a population of more than one million Puerto Ricans, as of 1973
there were less than 70 Puerto Rican lawyers. In New Jersey, with a Spanish-speaking
population of over 300,000, there were three Puerto Rican lawyers. As to the shortage
of Native American lawyers, see the discussion in Strickland, Redeeming Centuries of
Dishonor: Legal Education and the American Indian, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 847, 861-
66.
71. See the discussion in Redish, supra note 65, at 393.
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The Admissions Failure of Black Applicants: Academic
Inferiority
To understand the need specifically for a racially oriented
admissions program, one must consider why objective indica-
tors of academic success are lower for blacks than for whites.
Some legal scholars contend that standardized aptitude tests
are "culturally biased," thus blacks as a group will necessarily
perform poorly on them.7" Yet if the LSAT, for example, is
culturally biased, so is the entire law school program and the
practice of law.7" The LSAT has at least the same predictive
validity for blacks as it does for whites,74 and I would imagine
that the same is true for the MCAT as well. The primary utility
of standardized aptitude tests is to predict academic perform-
ance at the upper and lower levels: students who score very
high on these tests are likely to perform at a relatively high
level in law school and medical school, and students who score
low on these tests are likely to perform relatively poorly.75 This
is no less true for blacks than it is for whites.76 Similarly, the
college grade point averages of blacks are culturally biased only
to the extent that college education is itself culturally biased.77
72. Cf. Griswold, supra note 64, at 515 (criticism of the LSAT as culturally
biased).
73. Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 559, 587 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Greenawalt].
74. See Consalus, The Law School Admission Test and the Minority Student,
1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 501, 509 [hereinafter cited as Consalus]; Greenawalt, supra note
73, at 586-87; Redish, supra note 65, at 377 & n.144.
75. The predictive validity of these tests probably assures their constitutionality.
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976) (racially disproportionate impact of
racially neutral aptitude test, used to screen police applicants, does not alone indicate
a constitutional violation). For a pre-Washington v. Davis argument to the contrary,
see Zimmer, Beyond DeFunis: Disproportionate Impact Analysis and Mandated
"Preferences" in Law School Admissions, 54 N.C.L. REv. 317, 371-85 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Zimmer].
76. See Consalus, supra note 74, at 515. For a general discussion of the theory
and operation of the LSAT, see generally id. at 508-16. Since these tests cannot mea-
sure motivation and similar factors, there will always be exceptions, of course, but that
fact in no way undermines the general predictive validity of the tests.
77. It is not questioned that college education, as does almost everything else in
the society, operates within a framework of "whiteness," but a black student, if he or
she is to succeed in that society, must learn how to operate within that framework.
Where cultural bias is significant is where a test purports to measure intelligence but,
in reality, and with a heavy cultural bias, measures acquired knowledge instead. The
use of such culturally biased tests to determine school assignment, ability grouping
and the like are improper, precisely because they do not measure what they purport
to measure and thus discriminate against persons who have not grown up in the "white
culture." See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 478, 484-85 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal
on this issue dismissed for lack of standing sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175,
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Perhaps it is time to stop taking refuge in the supposed
"cultural bias" of everything to explain the poor academic per-
formance of blacks as a group. It is clear from experience that
blacks (and any other students) who are admitted on the basis
of special standards are likely to perform poorly as a group in
comparison with the students who were admitted under the
regular standards. Regardless of whether there is any strong
correlation between academic performance and performance in
the practice of the profession,7" there is clearly a correlation
between objective standards and academic performance in pro-
fessional schools. Objective admission criteria are not
"culturally biased" to any significant degree in their predictive
value and it is time that we stop pretending that they are.
Our obsessive concern with the "cultural bias" of stand-
ardized aptitude tests and of academic programs merely serves
to mask the real problem. We do not want to say that blacks
as a group are academically inferior in comparison to whites as
a group. But in truth they are, which is the reason why reliance
on objective standards of academic qualification will necessar-
ily result in the virtual exclusion of blacks from the limited
number of places available in law schools and medical schools
today."
To properly understand the need for special admissions
based on race, one must understand why blacks as a group are
academically inferior to whites as a group. For one willing to
face the realities of American life and the condition of blacks
in American society, the answer is painfully obvious. Blacks as
a group are academically inferior to whites as a group because
they receive substantially less benefit from primary and sec-
ondary education in this country than do whites as a group.
The reasons they receive substantially less benefit than do
whites relate both to the conditions of life for blacks in Ameri-
can society and to the historically segregated nature of public
education in this country.
Economic condition. In terms of conditions of life, the pri-
mary consequences for blacks as a group after years of societal
190 (D. C.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340,
1345 (E.D. La. 1971) (disallowing use of tests to group students in recently desegre-
gated schools), aff'd per curiam, 456 F.2d 1285 (3rd Cir. 1972).
78. See note 64 supra.
79. Of course in the past, racial discrimination was also a reason why blacks were
excluded from law and medical schools. See Blumrosen, Legal Education for Black
Students: A Remedy for Class Discrimination, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 800-01;
O'Neil, supra note 6, at 947-48.
[Vol. 17
RACIAL PREFERENCE
racism has been black poverty. Of course the impact of this
poverty is felt most strikingly by the children who grow up in
it.so It is not necessary to set out at length the now all too
familiar statistics showing the substantial income gap between
blacks and whites in this country and the substantially higher
incidence of real poverty among blacks." Suffice it to say that
a much larger proportion of black children than white children
grow up in poverty, making it far more likely a black child will
be economically disadvantaged in comparison to a white child.
There is a direct correlation between economic condition
and academic performance. That is, the economically disad-
vantaged child is likely to be educationally disadvantaged also.
The child from an advantaged home is more likely to have had
pre-school training than the child from a disadvantaged home.
Such a child also receives many intangible benefits relating to
learning and academic ability not available to the disadvan-
taged child.82 The evidence is indisputable that children from
advantaged homes, as a group, have a much higher level of
academic performance than do children from disadvantaged
homes, as a group. As has been observed, "[W]hatever the
average inate abilities of members of different races, social
conditions in this country are the main determinant of differ-
ences in the average intellectual performances of blacks and
whites. 8 3 Because the proportion of economically disadvan-
taged children is higher among blacks than among whites, the
conclusion that whites as a group will be academically superior
is foreordained before the children start school.
Segregated educational experience. The "built-in" handi-
80. As to the impact of black poverty on the children who grew up in it, see
generally Rainwater, Crucible of Identity, The Negro Lower-Class Family, in THE
NEGRO AMERICAN 160 (T. Parsons & K. Clark eds. 1966).
81. Black family income was approximately 60% of white family income as of
1974, a figure that has remained fairly constant over the last decade. 1975 ABSTRACT,
supra note 56, table 634. Approximately 30% of all black families, compared with 11%
of all white families, have incomes under $5,000. Below the $10,000 income level, the
comparison is 59% of the black families to 33% of the white families. Id., table 632.
Over 40% of all black children grow up in families with income below low income level
compared with 11% of white children. Id., table 652.
82. See generally J. COLEMAN, et al., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 298-
302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN REPORT]. As Professor Kaplan has observed,
"The first and most obvious relation between social class and the educational process
is that, in general, the higher the student's social class, the better he will do in school."
Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 157, 196 & n.105 (1963) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Kaplan].
83. Greenawalt, supra note 73, at 584.
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cap that disadvantaged black children have could be reduced
if they were allowed to attend schools predominated by advan-
taged children. It appears clear that the most significant factor
affecting academic achievement of children as a group is the
social class composition of the school. Where disadvantaged
children are attending predominantly advantaged schools they
will do better on the whole than if they were attending predom-
inantly disadvantaged schools 4 although, in the absence of
special compensatory programs, they will not do as well as the
children coming from advantaged backgrounds. 5 On the other
hand, children coming from advantaged backgrounds, but at-
tending predominantly disadvantaged schools, will do less well
as a group than they would if they were attending predomi-
nantly advantaged schools.86 Although, whether racial segrega-
tion per se is an academic handicap to black students is essen-
tially a moot question,"' at least some evidence indicates that
it is a handicap regardless of the socio-economic composition
of a school.88 But the question is largely irrelevant, since given
84. However, this will not be true if students are internally segregated by sepa-
rate classrooms, ability grouping or other criteria. Strictly speaking, it is the social
class composition of the classroom that affects the achievement of the lower class child.
85. See generally COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 105. The conclusions are effec-
tively summarized in Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 400-03 (1972). Again quoting Professor
Kaplan: "[Tihe social class composition of a given school has a powerful effect upon
the education of all the children in it." Kaplan, supra note 82, at 197 & n.107.
86. In a predominantly advantaged school, the academic performance of advan-
taged children will not suffer by the presence of a minority of disadvantaged students.
See generally Weinberg, The Relationship Between School Desegregation and Aca-
demic Achievement: A Review of the Research, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROa. 243, 268-69
(1975).
87. For a discussion of the various studies which lead to different conclusions on
the academic handicap of racial segregation, see id. at 244-68.
88. The thrust of the COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 82, is that the socio-economic
composition of the student body, rather than its racial composition, explains the edu-
cational benefit for black children arising from attendance at predominantly white
schools.
In 1967, the United States Commission on Civil Rights issued a report which,
while endorsing the major findings of the Coleman Report, contends that the racial
characteristics of fellow students does have an independent effect on the performance
of black children at the classroom level. See 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL
ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 81-82, 84-86, 89-91 (1967) [hereinafter cited as RACIAL
ISOLATION]. This is illustrated by the fact that the average academic performance of
disadvantaged blacks improved by two grade levels when disadvantaged blacks were
in a class with advantaged whites and by one full grade level even when disadvantaged
blacks were in a class with similarly disadvantaged whites. Id. at 91. See also Petti-
grew, The Consequences of Racial Isolation in the Public Schools: Another Look, in
H. HoRowITz & K. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 404-13 (1969).
RACIAL PREFERENCE
the class composition of the black population, predominantly
black schools will almost invariably be predominantly lower-
class schools.
The overwhelming majority of black children, until very
recently, have been educated in racially segregated schools.
Because racially segregated (predominantly black) schools are
almost invariably predominantly lower class schools, the over-
whelming majority of black children have attended schools
which did not maximize their educational potential. Wide-
spread segregation in education thus has increased the handi-
cap which disadvantaged black children already have and has
diminished the educational opportunities for black children as
a group.
Almost all black students who are in college today and who
thus will be applying for admission to law school and medical
school over the next few years have received all or the substan-
tial part of their primary and secondary education in predomi-
nantly black, lower class schools. 9 In the South, where approx-
imately half the blacks live today,90 very little desegregated
education occurred until the Supreme Court invalidated so-
called "freedom of choice" plans in 1968.1' Significant desegre-
gation of the urban school systems in the South did not result
until the Swann decision in 1971.92 Today, there is substantial
desegregation in the south, except in certain urban systems
where the white flight to surrounding suburbs has made actual
desegregation of the system a practical impossibility."3 Using
1969 as the starting date of substantial school desegregation in
89. Redish noted the practical effect on blacks of their segregated educational
experience: "The most obvious reason for the traditionally small number of minority
students in law school is the generally inferior level of secondary education which many
of them received in de jure or de facto segregated schools." Redish, supra note 65, at
385.
90. As of 1973, 52% of the black population lived in the South, 40% in the North
and 8% in the West. 1975 ABsTAcT, supra note 56, table 31.
91. Green v. County School, 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (such plans are
"unacceptable" when speedier and more effective alternatives are reasonably available
to convert to a unitary, nonracial school system). As of 1967 relatively few black
children in the southern and border states were attending schools where any substan-
tial number of whites were also in attendance. Cf. RACIAL ISOLATION, supra note 88, at
59, 66-70 (only limited desegregation has been achieved).
92. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
93. For an example of how the white flight has hampered desegregation of south-
ern urban systems, see Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming a
finding that the Atlanta school system, with an 85% black enrollment, was a unitary
system notwithstanding that 92 out of its 148 schools had student bodies that were over
90% black).
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the South (1972 would probably be more realistic), at least
until 1985 a black student from the South applying to a profes-
sional school will be likely to have attended segregated schools
during his full educational experience.
Outside of the South, desegregation is even less advanced;
a clear majority of black students still attend racially segre-
gated schools. Fully sixty percent of all blacks reside in the
central cities, 4 where adherence to the "neighborhood school"
method of student assignment has generally produced a condi-
tion of racial segregation in the public schools." In recent years,
more and more courts have found that racial segregation in the
cities outside of the South is due to deliberate racial policies
pursued by governing school boards, thus requiring desegrega-
tion of the school systems." Yet, because of the white move-
94. 1975 ABSTRACT, supra note 56, table 31. The balance of the black population
resides as follows: sixteen percent in metropolitan areas outside the central cities;
twenty-four percent in nonmetropolitan areas (largely in the South). Id.
95. In part this is due to the maintenance of separate urban and suburban school
districts in metropolitan areas, the urban districts being predominantly black and the
suburban districts substantially white. For example, in 1972 the percentage of black
students in the following urban school districts was: Chicago, 57.1%; Gary, 69.9%;
Baltimore, 69.3%; Detroit, 67.6%; Kansas City (Mo.), 54.4%; Newark, 72.3%; Cleve-
land, 57.6%; and Philadelphia, 61.4%. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DIRECTORY OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN
SELECTED DISTRICTS 311, 394, 551, 627, 760, 854, 1039, 1212 (1972). In a number of cities
the percentage was approaching the 50% mark, and generally increasing. See generally
id.; SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY, S. REP. No. 92-000, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1972). Regardless of
the black population in a school district, black students generally attend racially
segregated schools. As of 1970, in the eleven northern and western states having the
largest black -populations, 65% of the black children attended schools at least 50%
black, and 40% attended schools at least 90% black. For the largest school districts
within the following cities, the percentage of black students attending schools, at least
50% and 90% black respectively was (using 1971 statistics for 50% schools and 1970
statistics for 90% schools); 97.4% & 86.4% in Newark; 90.8% & 79.2% in Baltimore;
96.2% & 85.7% in Gary; 93.7% & 73.9% in Detroit; 92.6% & 70% in Philadelphia (1970
data); 93.7% & 58.6% in Oakland; 95.4% & 89.2% in Cleveland; 97.8% & 89.7% in
Chicago; 90.3% & 74.8% in Kansas City, Mo. A similar situation prevails where blacks
compose a minority of the students within the school district. For the following cities,
the percentage of blacks who attended a school at least 50% and 90% black was
respectively: Buffalo (40% black) 72.6% & 56.1%; New York City (34.3% black) 83.9%
& 57.9%; Los Angeles (25% black) 93.2% & 83.3%; Omaha (18% black) 70.7% & 48%;
Denver (less than 16% black) 54.7% & 37.5% (using 1971 statistics for 50% schools and
1970 statistics for 90% schools). Id., table 7-16.
96. The Supreme Court has made proof of a policy of segregation fairly easy to
establish by holding that a finding of de jure segregation as to a meaningful portion of
a school system raises a rebuttable presumption that other segregated schools within
the system were also the result of intentionally segregative actions. Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). See Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the
Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely
from Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535, 546-47 (hereinafter cited as Sedler]. For a
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ment to surrounding suburbs, many urban areas are now pre-
dominantly black. 7 Desegregation limited to such urban school
districts will be increasingly less meaningful as more affluent
people move away.98 As a result, it could be a very long time,
if ever, before the majority of black applicants to law school
and medical school will have received most or all of their pri-
mary and secondary education in schools not predominantly
composed of black lower class students.
Naturally there will be some exceptions to the group pic-
ture. Advantaged blacks who did not attend predominantly
black and lower class schools have not been educationally
handicapped. Presumably some will turn out to be among
those chosen by the regular admissions process for law school
and medical school. But the number of blacks who fall into this
category is exceedingly small and cannot hope to raise the rep-
resentation of black lawyers and doctors in the United States.
The same is true of the number of exceptional black children
who can surmount the handicaps of poverty and segregation
and compete equally with advantaged whites. To remedy the
current underrepresentation, an exception for minimally quali-
fied blacks must be allowed.
The Justification for Racial Preference in School Admissions
It should be evident by now that the primary justification
that I see for racially preferential admissions programs is the
need to increase the gross underrepresentation of blacks in the
medical and legal professions. This justification is related to
the constitutional right of black freedom, which is embodied in
the fourteenth amendment, and in the Civil War Amendments,
taken as a whole. This justification is a utilitarian one, related
to the interest of blacks as a group, and to the societal interest
in insuring full equality for blacks in American society, insofar
as that interest is advanced by appropriate black representa-
tion in the professions. It is this justification that I shall rely
partial listing of cases that have found non-southern school boards to be practicing de
jure segregation, see id. at 545 & nn.41-42. There have been a number of additional
cases since 1975, and it will be fairly rare today that a school district with a high
incidence of racial segregation will not be found to have been practicing de jure segre-
gation.
97. See Sedler, supra note 96, at 538-43.
98. Although made more difficult by Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), I
believe it possible, in many situations, to obtain a desegregation decree that cuts across
school district lines. For a general discussion and review of the post-Milliken cases, see
Sedler, supra note 96, at 576-619.
19771
356 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
upon to support the constitutionality of the racial preference
involved in Bakke.
Analysis of the constitutional validity of special admis-
sions programs based upon race can be obscured by the over-
lapping and sometimes inconsistent justifications, relative to
the means, which have been advanced in support of such pro-
grams.9 Confusion as to what is the real justification-the end
sought-distorts the proper constitutional analysis of the
means employed.' ° The difficulty of analysis is compounded
by the fact that within a given institution different decision-
makers may see different justifications and the particular ad-
missions program adopted may represent the result of a combi-
99. In Hupart v. Board of Higher Educ., 420 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the
special admissions program was declared unconstitutional because it was supported
by inconsistent justifications. In that case, the university had recognized an objective
to increase the number of physicians in the urban community and to increase the
number of minorities and women in the medical profession. Although the admissions
committee rejected adopting a specific quota for minority students, about half the
students admitted were from minority groups. In practice, the admissions committee
rejected white applicants who had been slated for acceptance and admitted minority
applicants in their stead. However, when the constitutionality of the admissions pro-
gram was challenged, the university argued that it did not discriminate on the basis
of race and that racial discrimination was contrary to the university's policy.
The district court concluded that there was racial discrimination. Significantly,
'however, the court observed the equal protection clause was violated because "the
State cannot justify making distinctions on the basis of race without having first made
a deliberate choice to do so." Id. at 1106. Moreover, due process requires that the
university adhere to its own regulations. Id. at 1107. As the court stated:
While perhaps not every classification by race is "odious," every
distinction made on a racial basis is at least suspect and must be justi-
fied. It cannot be accomplished thoughtlessly or covertly, then justified
after the fact. The defendants cannot sustain their burden of justification
by coming to court with an array of hypothetical and post-facto justifica-
tions for discrimination that has occurred either without their approval
or without their conscious and formal choice to discriminate as a matter
of official policy. It is not for the court to supply a rational or compelling
basis (or something in between) to sustain the questioned state action.
That task must be done by appropriate state officials before they take any
action. As the record now stands, the State, as represented by these
defendants, rejects race as a proper admission criterion, even in a pro-
gram with objectives that might arguably justify its use. There is, then,
no basis for the distinctions that were made by the State's agents on the
basis of race.
Id. at 1106 (citations omitted).
100. The importance of having a clearly articulated justification was underscored
by the New York Court of Appeals when it wrote: "Additionally, where preference
policies are indulged, the indulgent must be prepared to defend them. Courts ought
not be required to divine the diverse motives of legislators, administrators, or as here,
educators." Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 336, 348 N.E.2d 537,
546, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 90 (1976).
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nation of different justifications. ' "'
Cultural bias. A frequently advanced justification for pref-
erential admissions is the supposed cultural bias of standard-
ized admissions tests and of other standardized objective eval-
uations of academic performance or potential.' 2 This has led
to the argument that black students may be intrinsically more
qualified than current standard evaluation methods indicate.
However, if the cultural bias of the existing admissions criteria
were the real justification, there would be no rational basis for
imposing a racial quota or for continually admitting a reasona-
ble number of black students. The objective of an admissions
program based on this justification would still be to choose
those applicants, from among the group minimally qualified,
who are most qualified, not merely to increase minority repre-
sentation. The cultural bias status of a disadvantaged appli-
cant would be relevant only insofar as it enhanced the predic-
tive quality of the objective indicators. Thus, a black student
might be considered more likely to succeed in school than a
white student who had slightly higher college grades or a
slightly better score on the LSAT or MCAT when allowance is
made for the cultural bias of the objective indicators. Cultural
bias then would be simply another factor in the regular admis-
sions process which all students would pass through.
I seriously doubt that such an approach, if it is truly ad-
ministered without regard to racial preference, would result in
many additional blacks being accepted for law school and med-
ical school over those now accepted by the regular admissions
process. On the other hand if it is administered on the basis of
race, the justification fails because of an ends-means inconsis-
tency: there is no rational relationship between the existence
of cultural bias and the use of racial quotas to overcome that
bias.
Compensatory justice. Another justification for special
admissions might be compensatory justice. One could argue
that preference should be given to persons who have suffered
societal disadvantage in order to compensate for that disadvan-
tage.103 As with cultural bias, this justification has nothing to
do with the admission of black students, since race is logically
101. As to the variety of possible justifications for a racially preferential admis-
sions program see Henkin, DeFunis: An Introduction, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 489-91
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Henkin]; Nickel, supra note 60, at 536.
102. See notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra.
103. For a discussion of the compensatory justice rational, see Nickel, supra note
60, at 537-39.
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and functionally irrelevant when compensating one for having
suffered social or economic disadvantage.' 4 Disadvantaged
whites are as deserving of special consideration as disadvan-
taged blacks,'"5 since they start out with the same "built-in"
educational handicaps due to their economic condition as dis-
advantaged blacks. Therefore, regardless of whether adminis-
tering compensatory justice is a compelling social objective, it
is not achieved by a program which classifies one on the baisis
of race. As with cultural bias, there is an end-means inconsis-
tency that causes compensatory justice to fail as a justification.
Nor do I see any difference if the justification for the pref-
erence is compensatory justice for blacks as a group. Apart
from questions of who is entitled to claim compensatory justice
on behalf of the group,10 disadvantaged whites as a group
would also seem to have a claim to compensatory justice, not-
withstanding that they suffered injury because of the class
structure in the United States rather than because of societal
racism. Moreover, they are the ones who are least likely to have
benefited from societal racism. If the justification is compensa-
tory justice, the preference should be for all disadvantaged
persons, regardless of race.
Increase minority representation. Only when the social
objective is racial in nature can one justify a means which
involves a preference based upon race. Two racial justifications
were advanced in Bakke, which the court assumed arguendo to
be compelling. °7 First, the admission of blacks will serve to
integrate the student body, thereby enhancing the educational
experience for all students. Second, the admission of blacks
will increase the number of blacks in the professions, thereby
reducing their underrepresentation' °" and more effectively serv-
104. Although the Bakke court did not speak in terms of compensatory justice,
it did observe that one's disadvantaged background could be considered in deciding
who to admit. However, "[dlisadvantaged applicants of all races must be eligible for
sympathetic consideration . . . .None of the foregoing measures (to increase minority
enrollment) can be related to race, but they will provide for consideration and assis-
tance to individual applicants who have suffered previous disabilities, regardless of
their surname or color." 18 Cal. 3d at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
105. As to the problem of determining who is entitled to "compensatory justice,"
see Nickel, supra note 60, at 537, 555-58.
106. See id. As to compensation to the group itself, see id. at 538-39.
107. 18 Cal. 3d at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
108. Increasing minority representation was not in itself assumed to be compel-
ling. Rather, the court stated "[tihe two major aims of the University are to integrate
the student body and to improve medical care for minorities." Id. "[Tihe second
major objective of the [University's] program [isi the need for more doctors to serve
the minority community." Id. at 56, 553 P.2d at 1167, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 695. See text
[Vol. 17
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ing the needs of black communities.
Although legal commentators have supported the utility of
the integration objective, °9 the argument is flawed. That objec-
tive implies that blacks are admitted, not because of the need
for black lawyers and doctors, but because the presence of
black students will advance the educational goals of the insti-
tution. In terms of value, the objective raises the question
whether such an objective is of sufficient importance to society
to justify the resulting racial discrimination.10 In any event,
the objective of increasing the number of blacks in the profes-
sions will necessarily achieve the integration objective, so as to
avoid the necessity for independent justification.
The second objective advanced in Bakke is, in my view,
the strongest justification for racial preference. The Civil War
Amendments were designed, not simply to set blacks free, but
to raise them from the status of inferior beings,' and to enable
them to participate equally in society-a goal that has yet to
be fully realized." 2 Surely an aspect of black freedom is the
right to have blacks represented in the professions in some
reasonable proportion to their numbers in the society as a
whole," 3 and this objective is most effectively advanced by
racially preferential admissions programs.
Regardless of the differing justifications for special admis-
sions programs, it is clear that their primary purpose and effect
is to increase black representation in the legal and medical
professions. Since this is so, the criteria for admission should
be expressed in racial terms. The justification is not compensa-
tory but utilitarian. Racially preferential admissions programs
exist to achieve a racial purpose and must be justified on this
following note 111 infra. However, this recognizes the need for greater representation
if one considers that the medical and legal needs of blacks will most effectively be
administered by black doctors and lawyers. On this point, see Griswold, supra note
64, at 517; Nickel, supra note 60, at 541-42; Sandalow, supra note 8, at 686-90.
109. For a discussion of the integration objective, see Greenwalt, supra note 95,
at 590-92; O'Neil, supra note 7, at 949; Sandalow, supra note 9, at 684-96.
110. As to the "affirmative duty of educational institutions toward blacks to
provide some real chance for participation in majority-dominated social institutions,"
see Zimmer, supra note 75, at 346-53, 368-71.
111. See text accompanying note 133 infra.
112. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
113. The Bakke court recognized the argument that "minorities still labor under
severe handicaps. To achieve the American goal of true equality of opportunity among
all races, more is required than merely removing the shackels of past formal restrictions
.... " 18 Cal.3d at 61, 553 P.2d at 1170, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that equality could be achieved by means less intrusive on the constitu-
tional rights of white applicants. Id. at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
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basis. By this justification, the means is consistent with the
end.
Let me review the assumptions on which a racially prefer-
ential admissions program, with this as its justification, would
be based. First, there is the recognition that the normal work-
ings of the admissions process, based on objective academic
criteria (which we will assume are not "culturally-biased"),
will produce few, if any blacks, because blacks as a group are
less academically qualified than whites as a group. Second, the
objective is to bring about true racial equality, both in terms
of increasing the representation of blacks in the professions,
and enabling the needs of black communities for professional
services to be met effectively. This justification is utilitarian
rather than compensatory. It proceeds on the belief that blacks
as a group are more likely than whites as a group to meet the
needs of black communities for legal and medical services, and
it is certainly within "the legislative competence" of the insti-
tution to make such a determination. The program reserves a
minimum quota for blacks, usually corresponding more or less,
to the black population of the state."4 The normal admissions
process, relying on objective criteria, will likely continue to be
employed to allocate the remaining places among the appli-
cants.
Because the justification is utilitarian, the emphasis is on
the present needs of blacks for adequate legal and medical
services; the preference is not designed to compensate blacks
as a group for past wrongs inflicted upon them. In fact, com-
pensatory justice has nothing to do with the program, and there
is no desire to improve opportunities for disadvantaged persons
or to increase the number of lawyers coming from disadvan-
taged backgrounds. Since the objective is to increase black
114. For constitutional purposes, any reasonable number should be proper even
if it exceeds the proportion of blacks in the population, since the dangers normally
associated with quotas, such as oppression, would be absent. As Professor Ely notes,
when the white majority is giving a preference to blacks over whites, it is not "likely
to be tempted either to underestimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those
of others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative classification that
would extend to certain Whites the advantages generally extended to Blacks." Ely,
supra note 7, at 735. It has been argued, however, that this assumption should not
apply when the decision to discriminate is made by university faculties, who are "less
constrained than legislatures by the need to obtain public consent for their actions,
creating a danger that the choices they make will depart too widely from the values of
the larger society." Sandalow, supra note 8, at 696. Nevertheless, Professor Sandalow
concludes that the fact that these programs were adopted by universities rather than
by legislatures does not make them invalid. Id. at 701-03.
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representation in the professions, the sole criterion for inclusion
in the preference is blackness, and there is no concern with
whether those who are admitted are advantaged or disadvan-
taged, or with whether they have been demonstrably injured by
past discrimination. As a practical matter, the program will
likely favor advantaged blacks since they are apt to be more
academically qualified than disadvantaged blacks.
Who are injured as a result of the operation of the program
and the racial discrimination in favor of blacks as a group? The
effect of the program is to reduce the number of the places
available for the most qualified applicants from, let us say, 100
to 90. Assuming that the 10 places now reserved for blacks
would otherwise have been filled by white applicants, those 10
applicants have suffered direct injury as a result of the special
admissions program. The program itself has caused no injury
to any other white applicants. Other white applicants might
argue that they were discriminated against on the basis of race,
since, if they were black and had academic qualifications equal
or superior to those of the black applicants admitted under the
preference, they would have been admitted. Nevertheless, they
would not have been admitted if the program had not been in
effect, and therefore the existence of the program has caused
no injury to them. It should also be noted the discrimination
effected by the program is not directed against whites as a
group, as would be the case, for example, if all of the places had
been reserved for blacks. The racial discrimination here affects
individual whites, but does not result in substantial exclusion
of whites from medical school or law school.
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
We may begin our analysis of the constitutionality of the
racial discrimination in question by making some observations
that will help focus on the precise issues and the value prob-
lems presented. The sole basis for the claim of violation of the
constitutional rights of white applicants by a special admis-
sions program for blacks is that race is a criterion for admission
to the limited space set aside for applicants admitted through
the special program. In Bakke, for example, if the school arbi-
trarily reduced the number of applicants accepted from 100 to
84, and eliminated the special admissions program, there
would be no conceivable constitutional objection. Similarly, if
it had established a preference for minimally qualified students
1977]
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who were returning veterans,"5 or who had demonstrated a
"bona fide intention" to practice in an area where there was a
shortage of doctors or lawyers,"' or who could be classified as
"disadvantaged,""' there would be no constitutional objection
either. By comparison, since there is no constitutional right to
governmental employment or educational benefits solely on the
basis of "objective merit," presumably the school could estab-
lish a preferential admissions quota on virtually any rational
basis except race."' 8 The fact that the excluded white appli-
cants could have been excluded for a host of nonracial reasons
despite their presumed greater merit should at least raise a
question as to the seriousness of the injury they sustained when
they were excluded as a result of the state's effort to increase
the number of black lawyers and doctors."'
Yet, as the Bakke court observed, it would be improper to
label discrimination against individual whites as "benign,"
simply because the majority has discriminated against itself.20
Discrimination in favor of blacks against whites will not be
perceived as "benign" by those whites affected, 2' and it would
be inconsistent with the values reflected in the fourteenth
amendment, of which racial neutrality is clearly one, to sustain
racial discrimination simply because it was in favor of blacks
and against whites. Preferential admissions result in the denial
115. Statutes giving limited preference in civil service employment to former
veterans, although in opposition to the "objective merit" criterion of such employ-
ment, have survived equal protection attacks. See, e.g., Branch v. DuBois, 418 F.
Supp. 1128, 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252, 260 (M.D.
Pa. 1973); Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 251-52, 254 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd
mrnem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973). But cf. Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 499
(D. Mass. 1976) (absolute job preference, as opposed to rating preference, coupled with
restrictive Armed Forces recruitment practices, unconstitutionally discriminates
against females).
116. "[Tlhe University may properly as it in fact does, consider other factors
in evaluating an applicant, such as. . .matters relating to the needs of the profession
and society, such as an applicant's professional goals." 18 Cal. 3d at 54-55, 553 P.2d
at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
117. Id.
118. As the court stated in Bakke: "We reiterate. . . that we do not compel the
University to utilize only 'the highest objective academic credentials' as the criterion
for admission." Id. "[T]he standards for admission employed by the University are
not constitutionally infirm except to the extent that they are utilized in a racially
discriminatory manner." Id.
119. See Greenwalt, supra note 73, at 585.
120. 18 Cal. 3d at 48 n.12, 553 P.2d at 1162 n.12, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690 n.12.
Contra, Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348, N.E.2d 537, 545, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82, 89 (1976) ("We reject, therefore, the strict scrutiny test for benign dis-
criminations .... ").
121. See, e.g., Lavinsky, supra note 39, at 526-27.
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of a very tangible benefit to the excluded whites. At a mini-
mum, they are denied attendance at a chosen institution and
possibly entrance into the profession. Unlike a white property
owner compelled to convey property to a black under an open
housing law, for example, or a white child who is bussed out of
his neighborhood for purposes of school desegregation,'2 the
excluded white applicant suffers racial injury of a demonstra-
bly substantive nature, and may properly claim a "right" to be
free from such discrimination.'23 Therefore, although the con-
stitution is not colorblind, the analysis appropriate in such
desegregation cases is not appropriate in analyzing the particu-
lar racial discrimination presented by racially preferential
admissions programs.
Finally, the constitutionality of discrimination in favor of
blacks and against whites should not depend on whether the
discrimination was effected voluntarily by the institution, or
was undertaken to remedy the effects of past discrimination
against blacks by the institution or by the state. Courts have
sustained racial preferences in favor of blacks over whites
where this was considered necessary to remedy the effects of
past discrimination against blacks, even though the preferred
blacks were not themselves shown to be the victims of the past
discrimination. 4 The Bakke court considered those cases in-
applicable because the university was not shown to have pre-
viously discriminated against blacks.'25 In rejecting the argu-
122. "Classification by race has been upheld in a number of cases in which the
purpose of the classification was to benefit rather than to disable minority groups."
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal.3d 34, 46, 553 P.2d 1152, 1160, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680, 688 (1976). Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (classification to provide
instruction in English to students of Chinese ancestry); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (classification to achieve integration in
public schools).
123. According to the court in Bakke:
These cases [of school desegregation] differ from the special admissions
program in at least one critical respect, however. In none of them did the
extension of a right or benefit to a minority have the effect of depriving
persons who were not members of a minority group of benefits which they
would otherwise have enjoyed. . . . The disadvantages suffered by a
child who must attend school some distance from his home or is trans-
ferred to a school not of his qualitative choice cannot be equated with the
absolute denial of a professional education as occurred in the present
case.
18 Cal. 3d at 46-47, 553 P.2d at 1160-61, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89.
124. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), modified en banc,
452 F.2d 327, 330-31, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (racial quota for hiring new
employees based on past discrimination).
125. 18 Cal. 3d at 57, 553 P.2d at 1168-69, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
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ment that the university's program was constitutional because
it was undertaken voluntarily rather than imposed by court
order, the Bakke court stated: "To the victim of racial discrim-
ination the result is not different under either circumstance."'26
But the same can be said when racial discrimination is allowed
as a remedy for past discrimination. The impact of the prefer-
ence in favor of blacks is felt by individual whites, not by the
employer or by the government;' and the white worker, for
example, who is denied employment opportunities so that
blacks may be preferred, in all probability did not benefit from
the past discrimination.
As will be seen, in these cases the courts have tried to
accommodate the conflicting interests of black workers and
white workers, and to deal with the consequences of the prior
discrimination against blacks as a group without unreasonably
discriminating against individual whites. Their approach in
these cases, in my view, has great utility in determining the
constitutionality of racially preferential admissions programs
absent a showing of prior discrimination. In these cases it is the
prior discrimination that furnishes the justification for giving
racial preference to blacks. But, as previously indicated, the
state is also justified in allowing racially preferential admis-
sions for blacks in light of the gross underrepresentation of
blacks in the legal and medical professions and the inability of
blacks as a group to obtain admission in reasonable numbers
without racial preference. The point to be emphasized is that
regardless of the justification for the racial preference for
blacks, the impact is not noticeably different. The fundamen-
tal question still is whether the Constitution prohibits the state
from discriminating in favor of blacks as a group in seeking to
achieve what it considers to be valid societal objectives.
If such discrimination is necessarily unconstitutional, it is
because the fourteenth amendment prohibits all racial discrim-
126. Id. at 58, 553 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
127. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The Court noted that
"a sharing of the burden of the past discrimination is presumptively necessary
[between the employer and innocent employees]. Id. at 777. The impact on white
workers could be lessened by placing the burden entirely on the employer or the
government, such as by requiring the immediate hiring of a certain number of
additional workers, who would be black, and directing the employer to maintain such
an increased work force. Similarly, blacks could be given back seniority and the em-
ployer could be precluded from laying off white workers who would have less seniority
as a result. Cf. id. at 777 n.38 (noting possible remedial actions to shift to the employer
the burden of past discrimination).
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ination: once the action of the state is held to amount to racial
discrimination, it is per se unconstitutional. I's In Bakke, the
court stated:
[W]e do not hesitate to reject the notion that racial dis-
crimination may be more easily justified against one race
than another ....
Regardless of its historical origin, the equal protection
clause by its literal terms applies to "any person," and its
lofty purpose, to secure equality of treatment to all, is
incompatible with the premise that some races may be
afforded a higher degree of protection against unequal
treatment than others. " "
But while it is indeed true that one lofty purpose of the four-
teenth amendment is to "secure equality of treatment for all,"
there are other values and purposes embodied in it. The four-
teenth amendment, and the Civil War Amendments as a
whole, also embody the value of black freedom, and the imple-
mentation of that value may, in certain circumstances, justify
racial preference for blacks.
A Constitutional Value of Equal Protection: Black Freedom
As the Supreme Court stated in the Slaughter-House
Cases, the primary historical purpose of the fourteenth amend-
ment was "the freedom of the slave-race, [and its protection]
. ..from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him."' 130 While the Court in the
Slaughter-House Cases indicated the equal protection clause
was not limited to blacks, it did state:
[IWf other rights are assailed by the States which properly
and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles,
that protection will apply, though the party interested
may not be of African descent. But what we do say, and
what we wish to be understood is, that in any fair and just
construction of any section or phrase of these amendments,
it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said
was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they
were designed to remedy, and the process of continued
addition to the Constitution, until that purpose was sup-
128. See note 39 supra.
129. 18 Cal. 3d at 51, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
130. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 71 (1873). See generally Frank & Munro, supra note
20, at 132-42.
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posed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can
accomplish it.' 3'
Clearly then, "the amendment cannot be applied without a
sense of its historical meaning and function."'32
Considering the Civil War Amendments as a whole, Pro-
fessor Kinoy has argued they were designed to create a consti-
tutional right of black freedom, I to overturn forever the prem-
ise that blacks were an inferior or subordinate class. As Kinoy
stated:
[T]he main thrust of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments was the construction of a penumbra
of legal commands which were designed to raise the race
of freedmen from the status of inferior beings-a status
imposed by the system of chattel slavery-to that of free
men and women, equal participants in the hitherto white
political community consisting of the "people of the
United States". The constitutional right of the black race
to this status of freedom was the simple and central objec-
tive of the Reconstruction Amendments.13
The significance of this constitutional right of black freedom
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., where it held that Congress had the power, under
the implementing clause of the thirteenth amendment, to pro-
hibit all racial discrimination by private persons in the sale and
rental of property.1'3 The Court based its holding on the prem-
ise that under the amendment, Congress had the power to
eliminate the restraints upon fundamental rights which are the
essence of civil freedom.' 6 The Court wrote:
And when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos
and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color
of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.
... . At the very least, the freedom that Congress is
empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment
includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can
buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If
Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least
131. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) at 72.
132. Ely, supra note 7, at 728.
133. Kinoy, supra note 15.
134. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
135. 392 U.S. 409, 438-39 (1968).
136. Id. at 440-41.
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this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a prom-
ise the Nation cannot keep."'
The primary value of the fourteenth amendment, then,
was black freedom and while the value of racial neutral-
ity-developed by the Court later'3 -is also a value, one can-
not contend that it was intended to supplant the value of black
freedom. Certainly discrimination in favor of blacks cannot be
considered a relic of slavery. Nor can the cause of black free-
dom be advanced by barring a program which specifically fa-
vors blacks at a time when black freedom has not yet been
achieved in American society. Considering the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment, one must be startled that it would be
interpreted to render unconstitutional affirmative state efforts
to make black freedom a reality.
The Wartime Amendments reflected a promise made to
the newly freed blacks of full equality in American society: a
place in society for blacks as a group equal to that enjoyed by
whites as a group.13 Once full equality between blacks and
whites is achieved, the constitutional right of black freedom
will have served its purpose, and the sole value of the four-
teenth amendment can then be equality for all. At that time,
the Constitution truly can be "color blind."
Unfortunately, that time has not yet arrived. In America
today we have the tragedy of "two societies, black and white,
separate and unequal."'40 As part of the consequences of being
"separate and unequal," blacks as a group have dispropor-
tionately fewer doctors and lawyers, and the academic qualifi-
cations of black applicants to law school and medical school,
as a group, are inferior to those of white applicants as a group.
To implement the constitutional right of black freedom, a state
university should be able to give limited preference to blacks
in admission to its medical schools and law schools. As the New
York Court of Appeals observed in Alevy, "It would indeed be
ironic and, of course, would cut against the very grain of the
amendment, were the equal protection clause used to strike
down measures designed to achieve real equality for persons
137. Id. at 442-43.
138. See Sandalow, supra note 8, at 664.
139. See also Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: An Historic Step Forward,
22 VAND. L. REv. 475 (1969).
140. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (Ban-
tam ed. 1968).
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whom it was intended to aid."'' Although the majority too is
protected from some racial discrimination by the fourteenth
amendment, it is submitted that they are not protected against
the type of discrimination which is designed to provide benefits
for blacks as a group, and which does not discriminate against
whites as a group. And, as discussed below, in the cases coming
before the Court, the discrimination in question was found to
be "invidious," and thus unconstitutional because it could not
conceivably advance any valid state interest and was simply
"discrimination for discrimination's sake."
The Appropriate Constitutional Test for Racially Preferential
Admissions Programs
Strict scrutiny. When the California Supreme Court con-
sidered Bakke, it saw a racial classification which triggered the
result-oriented strict scrutiny test and raised the question of
whether the classification furthered a compelling state interest
in a manner least intrusive to majority rights. But applying
this test obscures the crucial value judgment which must be
made in order to determine whether the particular racial dis-
crimination involved is unconstitutional.'42 More significantly,
the Supreme Court has clearly developed a doctrine, totally
apart from the compelling state interest test, by which the
constitutionality of racial discrimination can be evaluated. It
is that doctrine which has been effectively applied in the past
to deal with claims of racial discrimination rather than the
compelling state interest test.
The compelling state interest/strict scrutiny test appar-
ently originated 4 ' in the Japanese relocation cases of
Hirabayashi v. United States' and Korematsu v. United
141. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 334-35, 348 N.E.2d 537, 544-45, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 89 (1976);
cf. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir.
1968) (urban renewal agency must take affirmative steps to overcome rampant dis-
crimination in community housing market in meeting its duty to relocate persons
displaced by its projects):
What we have said may require classification by race. That is something
the Constitution usually forbids, not because it is inevitably an imper-
missible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our na-
tional shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial ine-
quality. Where it is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will be
allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by
race, it will be required.
142. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
143. Cf. O'Neil, supra note 6, at 934-35 (asserting that the United States Su-
preme Court has never defined "compelling state interest").
144. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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States. " The Court there upheld the government's right to
remove persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast.
Only in those cases'46 has the Court ever "sustained an explic-
itly racial classification detrimental to a minority group.' ' 7
Strictly speaking, in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the discrim-
ination was on the basis of ancestry. But as the Court in
Hirabayashi recognized, "[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded on equality. For
that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based
on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protec-
tion. 1" 4 Focusing on the particular racial discrimination,
rather than simply recognizing the existence of a racial classifi-
cation, the Court set forth the important principle that "racial
discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and
therefore prohibited."" 9 Nevertheleess, it upheld the constitu-
tionality of the particular racial discrimination because of the
exigencies of wartime. In Korematsu, the Court attempted to
minimize the racial nature of the discrimination by emphasiz-
ing it was based only on Japanese ancestry and instituted be-
cause the United States was at war with Japan. 5 ' However, the
Court's decisions in these cases has not stood the test of time; 5'
there is no doubt that it most seriously undermined the value
of racial neutrality and of individual freedom in American so-
ciety.
Clearly in these cases the Court made a value judgment
upholding the racial discrimination in question. In neither case
did the Court purport to be determining the validity of a racial
classification under the strict scrutiny test. If it had, however,
it doubtless would have concluded that the interest of military
security was "compelling," and could not be advanced by
means "less drastic" than forcibly relocating the Japanese pop-
ulation from the West Coast. In any event, these cases furnish
145. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
146. Referring to Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Bakke court observed: "It has
been more than three decades since any decision of the United States Supreme Court
upheld a classification which resulted in detriment solely on the basis of race .
18 Cal. 3d at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
147. O'Neil, supra note 6, at 934.
148. 320 U.S. at 100.
149. Id.
150. 323 U.S. at 223-24.
151. For a severe criticism of the Court's position, see, e.g., Rostow, The Japa-
nese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
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no authority for requiring that the constitutionality of racial
discrimination be determined by reference to a compelling
state interest which cannot be achieved by "less drastic
means."
In more recent times, the Supreme Court supposedly
adopted the compelling state interest test in McLaughlin v.
Florida'52 and Loving v. Virginia,'53 to determine the constitu-'
tionality of racial discrimination. In neither case, however, did
the Court distinguish between "compelling" and "legitimate"
state objectives nor did the Court consider whether the ends
could be achieved by less drastic means.
In McLaughlin the Court considered a Florida statute
which prohibited an unmarried interracial couple from occupy-
ing the same room at night. Such conduct was not barred when
engaged in by persons of the same race. The type of racial
discrimination being considered was directed equally against
blacks as a group and against whites as a group.'54 In invalidat-
ing the discrimination, the Court noted that the central pur-
pose of the equal protection clause was to "eliminate racial
discrimination emanating from official sources," and con-
cluded that "[tihis strong policy renders racial classifications
'constitutionally suspect,' . . . and subject to 'the most rigid
scrutiny,' . . . and 'in most circumstances irrelevant' to any
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose . . . .",5 The
Court further maintained that a law infringing on one's free-
dom from invidious discrimination would be upheld "only if it
is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accom-
plishment of a permissible state policy."'56 The state was un-
able to suggest any constitutionally acceptable legislative pur-
pose conceivably advanced by the racial discrimination ef-
fected by the statute. Without such justification, the discrimi-
nation "is reduced to an invidious discrimination forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause."'57 The key then, as McLaughlin
makes clear, is not that there is or is not a compelling state
interest, but whether there is invidious discrimination based on
race.158
152. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
153. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
154. This type of racial discrimination falls within category 2 of the four catego-
ries of discrimination set out in the text following note 40 supra.
155. 379 U.S. at 192 (citing Hirabayashi).
156. Id. at 196.
157. Id. at 192-93.
158. But cf. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 50-51, 553 P.2d
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In Loving, the Court invalidated Virginia's anti-
miscegenation law and further clarified the meaning of invidi-
ous racial discrimination. As in McLaughlin, the Court noted
that the "clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious
racial discrimination in the States."'' 6 It pointed out that the
fourteenth amendment had traditionally required a very heavy
burden of justification for statutes drawn according to race.6 0
If a racial classification were ever to be upheld, it "must be
shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some
permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimi-
nation which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment
to eliminate."'' Thus, the discrimination must be designed to
serve what the Court finds to be a proper purpose-a purpose
other than discrimination itself. There was no such purpose in
the Virginia law. Because the law only prohibited whites from
entering into an interracial marriage, its purpose was to main-
tain white supremacy," 2 a clearly impermissible and invalid
purpose.
In neither McLaughlin nor Loving were the states able to
present any reasonable objective, let alone a compelling one,
other than the racial discrimination itself. As the Loving Court
concluded: "There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies
this classification.' ' 3 Thus, although the Court spoke in terms
of requiring a heavy burden of justification to sustain the dis-
crimination, the less rigid test of reasonable relationship would
have been sufficient to invalidate the governmental action in
question. This is also illustrated by Bolling v. Sharpe,'4 where
the Court invalidated school segregation in the District of Col-
umbia. Applying the traditional rational basis test, the Court,
without extensive discussion, concluded that no legitimate
1152, 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 691 (1976) (rejecting the view that the "compelling
interest" measure is applicable only to invidious discrimination, defined as discrimina-
tion against minorities).
159. 338 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 9.
161. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
162. Id. Although the Court found that the statute burdened the "fundamental
right" of marriage, thus engaging the compelling state interest standard to test its
validity, the statute would not have survived a challenge under the less rigid rational.
basis test.
163. Id.
164. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying fifth amendment due process to segregated
schools in Washington, D.C.).
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purpose was served by school segregation." 5 Similarly, in
Anderson v. Martin, '" the Court invalidated a Louisiana voting
statute which required designation of the candidate's race on
the ballot. According to the Court, there was simply "no relev-
ance in the State's pointing up the race of the candidate as
bearing upon his qualifications for office,"' 7 apart from encour-
aging the voter to make the choice on a racial basis. Not having
a justification independent of the discrimination, the statute
was patently unconstitutional.
What the Constitution prohibits, therefore, is racial dis-
crimination for the sake of discrimination-racial discrimina-
tion which is invidious because it has no purpose apart from
discrimination itself. The only relevant value to consider when
analyzing invidious discrimination is the value of racial neu-
trality, the lack of which necessarily renders the discrimination
unconstitutional. Under this analysis, the rational basis test
would have been sufficient to bar the racial discrimination in
these cases.' The compelling state interest test thus has been
of no utility in enabling the Supreme Court to deal with the
constitutionality of racial discrimination, and is not in practice
the frame of reference with which the Court has approached
this question.
The essence of invidiousness, as we have seen, is the ab-
sence of a valid governmental purpose. Its essence is not dis-
crimination against blacks, and the opposite of invidious, for
constitutional purposes, is not benign discrimination.' The
Constitution prohibits purposeless discrimination against
whites just as it does against blacks. The crucial question,
however, is whether the Constitution necessarily prohibits ra-
cial discrimination that does serve a valid governmental
purpose, and it is that question to which we will now turn.
Balancing conflicting values. Whether racial discrimina-
tion is constitutional depends on the particular type of discrim-
165. Id. at 498. Although observing that the equal protection and due process
clauses are not interchangeable, the Court appeared to use a rational basis test. Be-
cause segregation is not reasonably related to a proper governmental objective, the
Court wrote, it violates the due process clause.
166. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
167. Id. at 403.
168. According to Professor Greenawalt, "[i]f the only purpose underlying a
classification is itself constitutionally forbidden, say the denial of opportunity for
minority groups, or the classification bears no reasonable relation to a legitimate
purpose that supposedly underlies it, then the classification is unconstitutional."
Greenawalt, supra note 73, at 561.
169. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra.
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ination involved. We have previously referred to four different
types of discrimination: (1) discrimination against blacks as a
group; (2) discrimination against both blacks as a group and
whites as a group; (3) discrimination in favor of blacks as a
group, which results in discrimination against whites as a
group; and (4) discrimination in favor of blacks as a group,
which results in discrimination against individual whites, but
not against whites as a group.
As to the first and second categories of discrimination, the
values of racial neutrality and black freedom operate in tan-
dem, and it is difficult to conceive of any valid governmental
purpose that could be achieved by such discrimination. A pos-
sible exception might be where there has been discrimination
against individual blacks and individual whites for the purpose
of bringing about racial integration in public housing by impos-
ing black and white quotas for each project, or where a state
court was asked to enforce racial quotas in a racially planned
community.'70 The purpose of achieving racial integration
would be relied upon to justify the racial quota and the result-
ing racial discrimination. In deciding whether that is a valid
purpose a court would make a value judgment of whether the
purpose of achieving racial integration is of sufficient societal
importance to justify the resulting discrimination against indi-
vidual blacks and/or individual whites.' 7 ' While I do not pro-
pose to suggest the resolution of that value judgment, I would
emphasize that it is the resolution of that value judgment on
which the constitutionality of the discrimination in question
would depend.
The Supreme Court has not yet considered the constitu-
tionality of the third and fourth categories of discrimination.
I would submit, however, that racial discrimination in favor of
blacks can be sustained as valid in certain circumstances if it
can be shown to be related to the value of black freedom. If it
is not related to this value, however, it is clearly unconstitu-
170. On the possible constitutional implications, see generally Bittker, The Case
of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387
(1962).
171. In such a situation, reliance on the compelling state interest test, because
it is result oriented, will likely obscure this value judgment. But cf. Otero v. New York
Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973) (recognizing a constitutional and statutory
duty to integrate a housing project, even to the extent of denying displaced minority
tenants a priority for the new housing they would otherwise be entitled to; the defen-
dant satisfied its "heavy burden" of justification for racial considerations used to
achieve its integration objective).
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tional. Suppose, for example, that in a predominantly black
city, an ordinance is passed reserving all public facilities for the
exclusive use of blacks. That ordinance would be patently un-
constitutional because it serves no valid governmental purpose
"independent of the racial discrimination which it was the ob-
ject of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.""' It flies in
the face of the fourteenth amendment's value of racial neutral-
ity, and the fourteenth amendment's value of black freedom is
not advanced by the subjugation of whites to blacks. The four-
teenth amendment, then, prohibits denial of access of public
facilities on the basis of race, whether it be blacks or whites
who are excluded.
A very different question is presented when the state dis-
criminates in favor of blacks as a group in order to advance an
interest related to the constitutional right of black freedom, as
when a state establishes a racially preferential quota for admis-
sion to law school or medical school. Although the discrimina-
tion is not purposeless, the Court still must make a value judg-
ment as to whether its purpose is a valid one. This value judg-
ment brings into play a conflict between the fourteenth amend-
ment values of racial neutrality and black freedom, values
which operate in tandem whenever there is discrimination
against blacks as a group or mutual discrimination against
blacks and whites equally. The resolution of that conflict may
require a balancing," a reasonable accommodation between
the interests of blacks as a group in full integration into Ameri-
can society, and the interests of whites as a group in racial
neutrality and freedom from discrimination.
To illustrate the balancing, suppose the highly unlikely
event that a state embarked on a crash program to increase the
number of black lawyers and doctors and decided that for the
next five years only blacks would be admitted to the state's
medical schools and law schools.' Although this would ad-
vance the value of black freedom, it would do so at the cost of
completely destroying the value of racial neutrality. To effec-
172. Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
173. Professor Henkin has posited the balancing question as follows:
[Aissuming the practices attacked in DeFunis are not impermissible in
principle, might the different possible purposes of such programs weigh
differently in a balance against the interests of those disadvantaged by
them, so that some "sacrifices" in some measure may be imposed on the
majority for some of the suggested purposes though not for others? And
if the cost to the majority is not ipso facto a barrier, is a state required
to justify the actual number of applicants admitted on a preferred basis
in relation to the societal purposes to be achieved?
Henkin, supra note 101, at 492-93.
174. See note 157 supra.
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tuate the purpose of the equal protection clause, the state is
constitutionally required to balance the values that it embod-
ies. Any preference given to blacks as a group must be
reasonable in its impact on whites as a group, and the state,
therefore, cannot constitutionally deny admission to all whites.
The state is constitutionally required to balance the conflicting
values and group interests and must adopt a means of achiev-
ing its objective that does not unreasonably discriminate
against whites. The total exclusion of whites as a group then,
in the unlikely event that it should ever occur, would be uncon-
stitutional, because the means chosen by the state to achieve
its objective do not strike a fair balance between the conflicting
fourteenth amendment values and the corresponding group
interests.
The requirement of balancing and making a reasonable
accommodation was recognized by the New York Court of
Appeals in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, when it held
that the state could grant a reasonable preference to blacks and
Puerto Ricans in admission to medical school.'7 5 The court took
the position that racial discrimination in favor of minorities as
a group should not be tested by the same standard as discrimi-
nation against minorities.' 6 Since such discrimination is
within the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, it would be
upheld if it advances a "substantial state interest." Such an
interest exists, said the court, if "on balance, the gain to be
derived from the preferential policy outweighs its possible det-
rimental effects."'7 7 Although the court did not say what specif-
ically would affect the balance, it did suggest that the discrimi-
nation must be limited in time and extent.
Further guidance on the matter of balancing conflicting
values associated with minority preference can be found in
decisions of the lower federal courts upholding racial hiring
quotas designed to eliminate the effects of past discrimination
175. Since Alevy could not show he would have been admitted to medical school,
but for the racial preference given to minorities, the court did not decide whether the
racial preference was reasonable. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 337-38, 348 N.E.2d 537, 547, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82, 91 (1976).
176. The court observed that the United States Supreme Court was moving away
from the "two-tiered" test. Id. at 333, 348 N.E.2d at 543-44, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
Further, "[iut would indeed be ironic and, of course, would cut against the very grain
of the amendment, were the equal protection clause used to strike down measures
designed to achieve real equality for persons whom it was intended to aid." Id. at 334-
35, 348 N.E.2d at 544-45, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
177. Id. at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
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against blacks. 7 ' When past discrimination has been shown,
the employer can be compelled to hire a minimum quota of
blacks. 7 ' The black hired, however, may not have suffered the
past discrimination and the white not hired may not have ben-
efited from such discrimination.8 0 Nevertheless, advancing the
group interests of blacks-and in this sense implementing the
value of black freedom-in such cases has been held, on bal-
ance, to outweigh considerations of racial neutrality, provided
that racial neutrality is not disregarded completely. For exam-
ple, if in order to remedy past discrimination, all future job
openings were reserved for blacks until a quota was reached,
there would be discrimination against white workers as a
group. This is improper, since the group interests of whites
must be accommodated within the preferential treatment
given to blacks. A reasonable accommodation would give pref-
erence to blacks as a group but still allow some whites to be
hired during the period of attaining a minimum quota of
blacks, so that whites as a group would not be excluded en-
tirely.
The leading case in this regard is Carter v. Gallagher.'
There, the city had a black population of almost seven percent,
but maintained a virtually all-white fire department. The dis-
trict court found the all-white nature of the fire department
was the result of racial discrimination and enjoined discrimina-
178. The University of California pointed to those cases in support of its racially
preferential admissions program. The court rejected its argument by limiting those
cases to situations where past discrimination by the employer is established. "Absent
a finding of past discrimination . . . the federal courts, with one exception, have held
that the preferential treatment of minorities in employment is invalid .... " Bakke
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d at 57, 553 P.2d at 1168, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
696.
179. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1972), en banc modifying,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The court did not
consider its order to hire twenty blacks "a 'quota' system because as soon as the trial
court's order is fully implemented, all hiring will be on a racially nondiscriminatory
basis." Id. at 330.
180. Id.; cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976) (adverse
effect on the interests of apparently innocent employees will not bar an award of
retroactive seniority status to victims of prior racial discrimination). Significantly
different from the lower court position in Carter, the Supreme Court in Franks recog-
nized that at such time as individual class members seek positions as truck drivers,
"evidence that particular individuals were not in fact victims of racial discrimination
will be material." Id. at 772. If the defendant establishes that an individual was not a
victim of past discrimination, retroactive seniority may be denied to the individual.
Id. at 773.
181. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), modified en banc, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
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tion against blacks in future hiring. Further, it directed that
the next twenty vacancies be filled exclusively by blacks,
American Indians and other minority applicants who otherwise
qualify. ' The Eighth Circuit held that this absolute preference
for minorities was impermissible, directing instead that one of
every three new firefighters be a minority until twenty minority
persons had been hired. The court stated:
The absolute preference ordered by the trial court would
operate as a present infringement on those non-minority
group persons who are equally or superiorly qualified for
the fire fighter's positions; and we hesitate to advocate
implementation of one constitutional guarantee by the
outright denial of another. Yet we acknowledge the legiti-
macy of erasing the effects of past racially discriminatory
practices. . . . To accommodate these conflicting
considerations, we think some reasonable ratio for hiring
minority persons who can qualify under the revised qualifi-
cation standards is in order for a limited period of time, or
until there is a fair approximation of minority representa-
tion consistent with the population mix in the area.'83
The same result has been reached in all of the other federal
circuits that have passed on the question: racially preferential
hiring quotas are constitutionally permissible so long as they
are reasonable and whites as a group are not excluded from
future employment opportunities.'84 While the Constitution
permits racial preference in order to advance a valid state in-
terest, whether it be the interest in eliminating the present
effects of past discrimination, or the interest in alleviating the
gross underrepresentation of blacks in the legal and medical
professions, it only permits a reasonable racial preference, be-
cause only by a reasonable racial preference can conflicting
consitutional interests be accommodated.
Conversely, imposing a promotion quota has been rejected
as unconstitutional where few promotions would exist and
182. Id. at 318, 323.
183. Id. at 330 (on rehearing) (emphasis added).
184. In regard to public employment see, e.g., Erie Human Relations Comm'n
v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974);
Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); Vulcan
Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beccher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.
1972). In regard to private employment, see, e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail
Deliverers Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975); Rios v. Steam Fitters Local 638, 501 F.2d
622 (2d Cir. 1974).
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would be limited to present employees. 5 In such a situation,
individual blacks, in effect, would be preferred over individual
whites. The reasonableness of racial preference has also been
involved in affirmative efforts to increase the number of black
supervisory personnel in school systems. In one case, where the
court upheld racially influenced promotions to principal and
vice principal, the proposal was that thirty five whites and
twenty blacks be advanced.8 6 But in another case, an integra-
tion program by which the vacant school administrative posi-
tions could be filled only by blacks was held to be impermissi-
ble.1 7
Where blacks are preferred then, the key factor is the rea-
sonableness of the preference. Whether the preference is de-
signed to eliminate the effects of past discrimination, or is
contained in an affirmative action program voluntarily under-
taken, the objective of advancing the interests of blacks as a
group cannot be achieved by means that unreasonably discrim-
inate against whites. The state must balance the conflicting
interests and constitutional values, and seek a reasonable ac-
commodation between them. When it does, its action, which
advances the fourteenth amendment value of black freedom
without unreasonably impinging on the fourteenth amendment
value of racial neutrality, is not unconstitutional, although it
results in discrimination against individual whites.
Under this analysis, the racially preferential admissions
program involved in Bakke would be clearly constitutional.
That program reserves only a limited number of places for
racial minorities, in relation to minority representation in the
general population, while all other places are filled without
regard to race. While this does result in discrimination against
those individual whites who would have been admitted in the
absence of the racially preferential admissions program, their
position is no different from that of the white employee who
would have obtained a job if it had not been for the black hiring
quota. Surely, the Constitution does not require a different
185. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 429
(2d Cir. 1975).
186. Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 at 1256 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
944 (1971).
187. Anderson v. San Francisco United School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal.
1972). But see Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 58 n.27, 553 P.2d
1152, 1168 n.27, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 696 n.27 (1976) (stating that the racial preference
in Anderson was barred not because of excessive preference, but because of the absence
of "a finding that the defendant had been guilty of prior discriminatory conduct").
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result where the basis for the exclusion is advancement of the
state's interest in alleviating the gross underrepresentation of
racial minorities in the legal and medical professions.'88
Let me summarize then the constitutional argument that
I believe should sustain the kind of limited racial preference
involved in Bakke. Putting aside the matter of "racial classifi-
cation" and the compelling state interest test, which merely
obscure the value judgments that a court will necessarily be
making when it decides whether or not any particular racial
discrimination is unconstitutional, and which is not the test
that the Supreme Court has applied in practice to determine
the constitutionality of racial discrimination, we must look to
the purpose and effect of the racial discrimination in question.
The fourteenth amendment embodies the value of racial neu-
trality and the value of black freedom. Generally, racial dis-
crimination will not advance a valid state interest, and in such
a case it is invidious and constitutionally forbidden. However,
increasing the representation of racial minorities in the medical
and legal professions clearly does advance a valid state inter-
est, being directly related to the implementation of the four-
teenth amendment value of black freedom. Because of the
shortage of available places and the academic inferiority of
blacks as a group in comparison to whites as a group, the state
may make a legislative judgment that increasing black repre-
sentation in the professions will be achieved effectively only by
the imposition of a racial admissions quota. Since the discrimi-
188. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974) affirmed a racial hiring
quota for the Alabama state police. The court stated:
In the absence of an invidious purpose, a determination of unconsti-
tutionality here would be clearly unwarranted. . . . [Tihe affirmative
hiring relief instituted sub judice fails to transgress either the letter or the
spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . No one is denied any right
conferred by the Constitution. It is the collective interest, governmental
as well as social, in effectively ending unconstitutional racial discrimina-
tion, that justifies temporary, carefully circumscribed resort to racial
criteria, whenever the chancellor determines that it represents the only
rational, nonarbitrary means of eradicating past evils.
The same "collective interest, governmental as well as social," in alleviating the gross
underrepresentation of blacks in the medical and legal profession justifies the limited
racial preferences for blacks in admissions to medical school and law school.
One should note that while the United States Supreme Court has invalidated
discrimination against women (see, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)), it appears to have sustained discrimination favoring
women in order to compensate for the effects of past discrimination. See, e.g., Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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nation does advance a valid state interest, it is not invidious
and thus not per se unconstitutional. But since the discrimina-
tion also creates a conflict between the fourteenth amendment
value of racial neutrality and the fourteenth amendment value
of black freedom, the amendment requires a balancing of the
conflicting values and an effort to accommodate the conflicting
interest. This balance is achieved if the discrimination ef-
fected by the program is reasonable and does not discriminate
against whites as a group. While this constitutional analysis
will permit discrimination on the basis of race against individ-
ual white applicants, it is well settled that individuals may be
required to make sacrifices for the public good. Moreover, the
fairness of this approach is heightened by the fact that ex-
cluded whites could have been excluded for a host of nonracial
reasons. Thus, the racially preferential admissions program
does not violate their constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
In this writing I have attempted to set forth a justification
for racially preferential admissions that accords both with the
realities of American life and with the values embodied in the
fourteenth amendment and in the Wartime Amendments,
taken as a whole. I have sought to show why, without the ra-
cially preferential admissions quotas adopted by law schools
and medical schools, very few members of minority groups will
be admitted. In that circumstance, the gross underrepre-
sentation of blacks in these two very important professions will
continue. I submit that a limited racial preference for minori-
ties, of the type involved in Bakke, is fully consistent with the
fourteenth amendment.
In Bakke, the California Supreme Court, in the context of
invalidating that preference by its application of the compel-
ling state interest test, in effect made the value judgment that
the Constitution prohibits the state from giving preference to
racial minorities because it results in racial discrimination
against individual whites. In so doing it placed its interpreta-
tion of "consistency of principle" above the interests of minori-
ties as a group in achieving true equality, and paid little atten-
tion to the realities of American life and the consequences of
societal racism. It focused only on the constitutional value of
racial neutrality and ignored the equally important constitu-
tional value of black freedom. While all it may have intended
to do was to force universities to be more disingenuous or to pay
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a higher price in their efforts to increase black representation
in the professions, if the universities are unwilling to do so, the
result of the decision may be to deal a crippling blow to this
aspect of black freedom.
I respectfully submit that the court made the wrong deci-
sion, that it failed to consider all the constitutional values in-
volved, and thus improperly skewed the value judgment that
it made. If the state cannot take affirmative action to alleviate
the gross underrepresentation of blacks in the medical and
legal professions, if it cannot give blacks the kind of limited
racial preference involved in Bakke, if it cannot try to make
meaningful the constitutional right of black freedom, then
truly, the Constitution has "made a promise the Nation cannot
keep. "189
Addendum
After this article was at the printer, the Supreme Court
decided United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 45 U.S.L.W.
4221 (1977). In that case, the Court upheld New York's use of
racial criteria in drawing legislative district lines to secure the
Attorney General's approval of the redistricting under section
5 of the Voting Rights Act. (42 U.S.C. § 1973c.) Justice White
announced the judgment of the Court and took the position
that the redistricting plan was constitutional both on the
grounds that it was adopted in an effort to comply with the
Voting Rights Act and that independent of the Act white voters
were not unconstitutionally discriminated against.
Only Justice Stevens fully concurred in the opinion. Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun concurred solely on the ground
that the plan was constitutional because it was adopted in an
effort to comply with the Act. Justice Rehnquist concurred
because the redistricting resulted in a fair allocation of political
power between whites and nonwhites. Justices Stewart and
Powell took the position that the redistricting plan was not
shown to have been adopted to advance a racially discrimina-
tory purpose. Chief Justice Burger dissented and Justice Mar-
shall did not participate.
Kings County, New York, became subject to section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act and the state was therefore required to
189. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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submit its 1972 reapportionment statute affecting legislative
districts in Kings County to the Attorney General of the United
States. The statute was rejected because the state had not met
its burden of establishing that the redistricting "had neither
the purpose or effect of abridging the right to vote by reason of
race or color." (45 U.S.L.W. at 4222.) Rather than challenge
this determination, the state made an effort to comply with the
Act so that the 1974 primary and general elections could go
forward under the 1972 statute. The revised plan did not
change the number of assembly and senate districts with non-
white (black and Puerto Rican) majorities, but changed the
size of the majorities so that all affected districts would be at
least 65% nonwhite. To achieve that majority, part of the Has-
idic Jewish community of Williamsburgh, previously located
entirely in one assembly and one senate district, had to be
reassigned to another assembly and senate district. United
Jewish Organizations, Inc., sued on behalf of the Jewish com-
munity, alleging that the value of their franchise was being
diluted solely for the purpose of achieving a racial quota in
violation of the fourteenth amendment, and that they were
assigned to voting districts solely on the basis of race in viola-
tion of the fifteenth amendment. The district court dismissed
the complaint and a divided Second Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
redistricting plan. Justices White, Stevens, Brennan and
Blackmun took the position that the plan was constitutional
because it represented a proper effort to comply with section 5
of the Voting Rights Act. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976), established the section 5 test that redistricting could
not "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities
with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral fran-
chise." (45 U.S.L.W. at 4225.) In order to comply with that
test, the state could increase the percentage of nonwhite voters
in a particular district until they would constitute a clear
majority of the voters. (Id.) Speaking for the Court, Justice
White stated, "neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth
Amendment mandates any per se rule against using racial fac-
tors in districting and apportionment," nor is the use of racial
criteria "confined to eliminating the effects of past discrimina-
tory districting or apportionment." (Id. at 4226.) Finally, his
opinion recognizes that a state can use a specific quota to es-
tablish nonwhite majority districts and the percentage of non-
whites in a district could be set at such a level as to ensure a
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majority of nonwhite voters.
Apart from an effort to comply with the Act, Justices
White, Stevens, and Rehnquist took the position that the state
could take race into account in order to "achieve a fair alloca-
tion of political power between white and nonwhite voters" in
the county. (Id. at 4227.) Justice White noted that the plan did
not "fence out" the white population from participation in the
political processes of the county or unfairly cancel out white
voting strength. The total number of districts with white ma-jorities remained roughly equal to their size in the population
of the county. In effect, he concluded that it was permissible
for the state to "alleviate the consequences of racial voting at
the polls" by insuring that nonwhites would have a majority in
at least some districts, in the same manner as it was permissi-
ble for the state to change from multimember districts to single
member districts for the purpose of increasing minority repre-
sentation. (Id.)
United Jewish clearly appears to be limited to a constitu-
tional analysis of racial discrimination involving the elective
franchise. Nonetheless, the case may have significant overtones
when the Court considers the issues presented in Bakke.
Significantly, only Chief Justice Burger appeared to take
the position that racial preference-reflected in racial quo-
tas-was necessarily unconstitutional. Justices White, Ste-
vens, Brennan, Blackmun and Rehnquist agreed that prefer-
ence for racial minorities through the use of quotas was consti-
tutionally permissible in some circumstances. Justice White's
opinion for the Court and Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
emphasize what may be termed "reasonable accommodation"
and "reality recognition" requiring that race be taken into ac-
count if true equality is ever to be achieved in American so-
ciety.
Different value choices were involved in United Jewish
than are involved in Bakke. In the former, the effect of the
racial preference was to dilute the voting power of a particular
group of whites, while in the latter, the effect was to exclude
individual whites from a particular school and possibly from
the profession itself. However, the voting power of whites in the
county was not impaired in United Jewish nor were whites as
a group excluded from medical school in Bakke. The five Jus-
tices voting to sustain the racial preference in United Jewish
recognized the group interest of blacks. A similar recognition
of the group interest of blacks lies at the core of Bakke.
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The real significance of United Jewish may lie in the fact
that the Court did not exalt the value of racial neutrality over
the value of black freedom and true equality for blacks in
American society. If the state may consider race when redis-
tricting in order to avoid dilution of black political power, then
the Court may also be willing to hold that the state can give a
limited preference to blacks and other racial-ethnic minorities
in order to alleviate the gross underrepresentation of minorities
in the legal and medical professions. United Jewish recognizes
that achieving full equality for blacks is a valid state interest,
and that is the premise on which I have relied to justify the
constitutionality of racially preferential admissions programs.
